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Abstract
As the People’s Republic of China has modernized, it has become increasingly reliant on Middle Eastern oil to
fuel its economy. But economics did not always play a primary role in China’s Middle East policy. This thesis
seeks to answer the questions: what have been the drivers of the PRC’s foreign policy in the Persian Gulf
region – and what historical, political, and economic circumstances caused them to evolve at such a rapid
pace? In analyzing Chinese foreign policy in Iraq over three chronological periods – the Cold War Period
(1958-1979), the Transition Period (1980-1988), and the Post-Cold War Period (1989-present) – this thesis
finds that China has always had an interest in regional stability. However, the definition of “stability” has
differed during each period, reflecting a general trend away from ideological and political considerations and
toward a focus on economic interests.
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ABSTRACT 
 
As the People’s Republic of China has modernized, it has become increasingly reliant on 
Middle Eastern oil to fuel its economy. But economics did not always play a primary role in 
China’s Middle East policy. This thesis seeks to answer the questions: what have been the 
drivers of the PRC’s foreign policy in the Persian Gulf region – and what historical, political, 
and economic circumstances caused them to evolve at such a rapid pace? In analyzing 
Chinese foreign policy in Iraq over three chronological periods – the Cold War Period (1958-
1979), the Transition Period (1980-1988), and the Post-Cold War Period (1989-present) – 
this thesis finds that China has always had an interest in regional stability. However, the 
definition of “stability” has differed during each period, reflecting a general trend away from 
ideological and political considerations and toward a focus on economic interests. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION  
PROLOGUE 
 Even though China’s Middle East presence has been confined to the past sixty years, 
the arc of China’s regional foreign policy has witnessed a complete about-face. During the 
1960s, China attempted to export its revolutionary ideology abroad, supporting revolutionary 
insurrections in Algeria, Palestine, Oman, and Yemen.1 By the 2000s, however, China had 
established a resolute posture of noninterference and registered its disapproval of Western 
efforts to enforce regime change in the Middle East. What, then, have been the drivers of the 
PRC’s foreign policy in the Middle East – and more importantly, what historical, political, 
and economic circumstances caused them to evolve at such a rapid pace?  
 The People’s Republic of China made its debut to the Middle East in 1955. The 
Asian-African Bandung Conference, held in Bandung, Indonesia, hosted delegates from 
twenty-nine mostly Third World countries, including the People’s Republic of China and the 
Kingdom of Iraq. Many Western scholars at the time anxiously interpreted the event as a 
sounding board for the Third World’s grievances against colonialism, racism, and 
imperialism perpetrated by the West.2 Their suspicion was not unwarranted. Even though the 
express purpose was to promote economic and cultural cooperation, human rights and 
international peace, the conference is also remembered for engendering the “Bandung spirit,” 
a shared global struggle against imperialism and colonialism.3  
                                                        
1 Yitzhak Shichor, “China’s Middle East Strategy: In Search of Wells and Power,” in China, the 
Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, ed. Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu. (Boulder: Lyne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2010), 156-176. 
2 Saunders Redding, "The Meaning of Bandung," The American Scholar, 25. no. 4 (1956): 414. 
3 "The Bandung Conference of 1955," China Daily, April 20, 2005. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/20/content_435929.htm (accessed January 6, 2013). 
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 The Bandung Conference reflected the complexities of a world reeling from the 
legacy of colonialism and embroiled in the midst of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. At the time, 
the relationship between China and the United States was particularly strained. Not only did 
Chinese leaders perceive America as the avatar of imperialism and the foe of communist 
countries worldwide – but to make matters worse, en route to the Bandung Conference, 
Premier Zhou Enlai narrowly escaped an assassination attempt that the Chinese blamed on 
the KMT and the CIA.4 Nevertheless, Zhou took great pains to appear cool and collected 
before the conference’s delegates. There already existed among the attendees a stigma 
against communism as dictatorial and neo-colonial in its own right. Zhou did his best to head 
off their concerns and delivered a speech in which he propounded:  
There exists common ground among the Asian and African countries, the basis of which 
is that the overwhelming Asian and African countries and their peoples have suffered and 
are still suffering from the calamities of colonialism. All the Asian and African countries 
gained their independence from colonialist rule whether these countries are led by the 
communist or nationalists. We should seek to understand each other and respect each 
other, sympathize with and support one another.5 
 
In the true Bandung Spirit, Zhou attempted to reach out to fellow nations who had been the 
victims of colonial and imperial aggression. This was the first opportunity that China had to 
engage with other members of the Third World in so public a forum. In doing so, China laid 
down the framework for its eventual relationships with countries in the Middle East-North 
Africa (MENA) region. Indeed, the year after the conference, Yemen, Egypt, and Syria 
                                                        
4 Wendell L. Minnick, "Target: Zhou Enlai—Was America’s CIA Working With Taiwan Agents to Kill 
Chinese Premier?”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 158 (1995): 54-55. 
5 “The Bandung Conference of 1955,” 2005. 
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formally recognized and established diplomatic relations with the PRC, while Egypt became 
the first Arab recipient of Chinese foreign aid.6 
 One of the Bandung Conference’s most significant achievements was the passing of 
the “Ten Principles of Peace.” Based off the 1954 Sino-Indian declaration of “Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence,” the agreement emphasized a consistent message of respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, and noninterference in other’s internal 
affairs.7 This message would become the rhetorical focal point of China’s Middle East policy 
for the next half century. It bears curious resemblance to contemporary China’s doctrine of 
noninterference in the affairs of other countries: the PRC’s reluctance to approve multilateral 
military action in Libya and Syria during 2011 and 2012, respectively, are but two examples. 
Yet it would be misleading to assume that China has always embraced a steadfast policy of 
nonintervention in the Gulf. In fact, this policy is a recent phenomenon that began to emerge 
following the end of the Cold War, and it is only in the past decade that China has gained the 
confidence to assert its opinions so vehemently on the world stage. 
 Iraq was considered the Gulf’s most important state until the more recent ascendency 
of Saudi Arabia following the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. Not 
surprisingly, Beijing has enjoyed a particularly deep and nuanced relationship with Baghdad 
since the Bandung Conference. As China’s long-standing relationship with Iraq has spanned 
the gamut of political, military, and economic cooperation throughout the latter half of the 
twentieth century, I submit that Iraq is heuristically representative of Chinese policy in the 
region. Just as importantly, the Sino-Iraqi bilateral relationship has encompassed many                                                         
6 Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955-75: Three Case Studies, (London: 
Kegan Paul International Ltd, 1981), 4. 
7 Sally Percival Wood, "‘Chou Gags Critics in Bandoeng: How the media framed Premier Zhou Enlai at 
the Bandung Conference, 1955." Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 5 (2009): 20. 
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different phases: direct partnership and antagonism, calculated neutrality, and strategic 
friendship – perfectly modeling the progression of China’s Middle East policy over time. 
Despite Iraq’s obvious importance to the development of Chinese regional policy and to 
China’s own domestic modernization, there is little scholarship devoted solely to the 
evolution of this bilateral relationship. Thus, my thesis seeks to bridge a gap in the body of 
academic work regarding Chinese-Middle Eastern relations by undertaking a full-scale study 
of the Sino-Iraqi relationship after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.   
 As an ascendant nation, China’s primary interest today is maintaining steady 
economic growth that can only be achieved through regional stability and carefully 
manicured relations with Persian Gulf countries. I hope that my contribution will be valuable 
to the community of China-watching scholars, that it might help to illuminate some of the 
motivations and rationales behind China’s actions in this region. I hope that it may offer 
some insight as to future directions in Chinese-Gulf relations, but particularly in situations 
where China’s cooperation with the world community clearly militates against its own 
strategic interests, even as it is critical for its reputation as a “responsible stakeholder.” 
BACKGROUND: TWO SCHOLARS, TWO SCHOOLS  
 Two schools of thought are at the forefront of theorizing Chinese foreign policy in the 
Middle East. One theory, proposed by John Calabrese, contends that China’s Middle East 
policy has always been couched as a factor of its relationships with the world superpowers, 
the United States and Russia. Other scholarship chronicles Chinese Middle East policy as a 
string of related, but evolving, phases that reflect China’s internal needs.8 
                                                        
8 Many scholars discuss Chinese policy within the entire Middle East-North Africa region. My study, 
however, confines itself to the Gulf region, as superpower attention and activity has traditionally 
been geographically trained on this zone. 
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Superpower Super-centrism 
 Authors such as John Calabrese stress the centrality of the United States and the 
Soviet Union (and now Russia) as constants in Chinese foreign policy decision-making. For 
Calabrese, China’s Middle East policy reflects the changes and shifts in Chinese foreign 
policy as a whole. Indigenous conflicts in the region have been ancillary at best, while 
China’s reaction to global events dominated by superpowers have been the principal 
determinant of China’s actions in the Middle East.9 In his book China’s Changing Relations 
with the Middle East, Calabrese traces China’s decision calculus through three stages.  
 The first period from 1950-1965, which he entitles “Probing without progress,” is 
characterized by “rapid socialist economic transformation…within a context of mutual 
suspicion, reciprocal provocation and generally implacable enmity between the United States 
and the Soviet Union.”10 Following just off the heels of the Maoist revolution, the early 
People’s Republic of the 50s through 60s was possessed by the fervor of anti-imperialism 
and anti-colonialism. This zeitgeist inspired Chinese policymakers to initially view the 
United States as the greatest perpetrator of these sins. Thus, from 1950-1957, China loyally 
committed to an alliance with the Soviet Union while orienting itself to combat the creeping 
specter of American imperialism. Over time, however, the relationship between Moscow and 
Beijing grew frosty as differences in Chinese and Russian ideology grew apparent. Beijing 
and Moscow began to contend for the mantle of leadership of the communist front and Third 
World organizations. Perhaps more specific to this study, Mao Zedong was displeased by 
Nikita Khrushchev’s embrace of Peaceful Coexistence and reluctance to directly challenge 
the United States on a military basis. Eventually, Beijing’s deep insecurity and seething                                                         
9 John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East (London: Pinter, 1991), 10. 
10 Ibid., 7. 
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resentment of the Soviets led to China’s reassessment of the Soviet Union as the greatest 
threat to regional and global stability. Beijing thus began to view the Middle East as a crucial 
theatre of Sino-Soviet rivalry.11 China’s policy was geared toward neutralizing the Soviet 
Union’s regional influence.  
 Calabrese labels 1966-1977 a period of “Paralysis to Pragmatism.” This period was 
coincident with the Cultural Revolution and witnessed an intensification of China’s hostility 
toward the two superpowers. Championing itself as the true standard-bearer of Marxism-
Leninism, China began supporting revolutionary movements and communist parties 
throughout the region, most notably rebels in South Yemen, Oman, and Palestinian lands, as 
well as communist factions in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. The end goal of supporting these 
liberation movements was to promote China’s brand of communism and especially to subvert 
Soviet revisionism and its threat to world revolution and regional stability.12 By this point, 
relations with the Soviet Union had reached rock bottom, and by the mid-70s, China had 
allied itself with the United States after coming to view the USSR as its primary enemy. 
America began escalate its presence in the Persian Gulf in response to Great Britain’s 
declining presence and as a means of precluding increasing Soviet influence. This supplied 
Beijing with an opportunity to pursue bilateral ties with Gulf regimes.  
 Calabrese’s third period, from 1978-1989, is labeled one of “Anti-Hegemonism to 
Modernisation.” Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, modernization became the guiding 
principle of Chinese foreign relations. Just as China focused on promoting modernization, it 
also had to protect its interests. Thus, economic and strategic incentives were tightly linked, 
and protecting continued modernization required stopping the USSR’s continued incursion                                                         
11 Ibid., 34. 
12 Hafizullah Emadi, China's Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East (Saddar Karachi: Royal Book 
Company, 1997). 
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into the Middle East.13 China began looking to the region as a market for weapons and 
potential exports. It also viewed the region as a source of diverse raw materials. By the end 
of the 80s, China’s foreign policy had detached itself from its ideological and Cold War 
underpinnings and now placed a primary emphasis on economic cooperation.  
 Unfortunately, Calabrese’s book was published in 1991 and ends there. Since that 
time, China has made vast strides with respect to its diplomatic, economic, and political 
relationships in the region. One downside of Calabrese’s framework is that it fails to account 
for foreign policy after the fall of the Soviet Union. And while his analysis of Chinese 
foreign policy as responsive to superpower politics is compelling within the context of the 
Cold War, it is necessary to draw on other theories to fully contextualize China’s Middle 
East policy in the Post-Cold War era. 
Progression and Evolution  
 Yitzhak Shichor offers a different approach in his analysis of Chinese Middle East 
policy. Instead, he breaks it up into a logical progression encompassing three distinct eras; 
one in the Maoist era and two in the post-Maoist era. While taking Calabrese’s theory of 
superpower influence into account, Shichor’s theory is broader and hesitant to center the 
whole of China’s Middle East policy around this theme. Shichor first presents the Maoist 
period, which was determined primary by inconsistent political factors – a mishmash of 
competing political, strategic, security, and ideological considerations that derived from both 
internal and external factors.14 Starting in the 1940s, the Middle East originally served as 
China’s strategic buffer against Nazi Germany before becoming a bulwark against Soviet 
presence in the 60s. Broadly speaking, China’s foreign policy from the 40s through the 50s                                                         
13 Calabrese, China’s Changing Relations with the Middle East, 118. 
14 Shichor, “China’s Middle East Strategy: In Search of Wells and Power,” 160.  
 From Beijing to Baghdad | 12 
reflected Chinese internal politics: fomenting Middle Eastern revolutions reflected Maoist 
belief that constant change, revolution, and transformation were integral to the socialist 
agenda.15 During the 1970s, China’s policy still exhibited the fractious nature of domestic 
Chinese politics: the learning curve was steep and an internal debate raged within Beijing 
about how to utilize its new position of power on the UN Security Council, what 
responsibilities it had as an international player, and how to avoid unnecessary entanglement 
in political issues tangential to strategic interests. This eventually led to a policy of 
abstention and absenteeism, the legacy of which is still apparent today. 
 While the Maoist stage was governed by political, strategic, security and ideological 
considerations, economics and pragmatism reigned supreme during the Post-Mao stage.16 
Shichor divide this stage into two parts: before the 1990s and after. Initially, China regarded 
the Middle East and Persian Gulf in particular as a huge market for Chinese goods and 
services, particularly labor export and construction contracts. During the late 70s, China 
increased its sales of arms and military technology, and the Middle East eventually became 
China’s leading arms market by the 80s. Beginning the 1980s, China began to buy small 
quantities of crude oil. The role of oil in Chinese regional policy is so important that Shichor 
delineates a second Post-Mao phase (post-90s) specifically to account for the rise of China’s 
Middle Eastern oil relationships. By the early 2000s, the Greater Middle East had become 
China’s principal source of oil imports, accounting for approximately 50-60% of the total.17  
 In sum, while China initially considered the Middle East as an arena for mediating its 
relationships with the global superpowers, a confluence of Deng Xiaoping’s opening up                                                         
15 Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China’s Foreign Policy 1949-1977 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), 159.  
16 Shichor, “China’s Middle East Strategy: In Search of Wells and Power,” 161. 
17 Ibid. 
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policy along with the demise of the Soviet Union transformed Middle East policy to one 
predominantly based on economic interests. Almost all literature on the broad trends 
governing Chinese Middle East policy ends at the beginning of the First Gulf War. Since 
then, most journal articles and literature have tended to cover Chinese reactions to events in 
the Middle East on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the question of how best to theorize Chinese 
Middle East policy in the post-Cold War era is open for debate. In the Post-Cold War era, the 
two most historically prominent factors – China’s wary eye toward the interests of the 
superpowers and China’s own nascent economic interests – were pitted once more against 
each other in the 1990s and 2000s, most notably in Iraq. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, 
the international community supported the United States’ effort to put an end to Saddam 
Hussein’s aggression. China was caught in the unfortunate position of having to weigh its 
own economic interests and bilateral relationship with Iraq against the option of deferring to 
the United States and the wishes of the world community. What factored into China’s 
decision to remain neutral at this point in history, and again during the Second Iraq War? My 
hope is that this project will contribute to the field an understanding of the drivers of Chinese 
foreign policy in the region, with particular emphasis to identifying a cohesive strategy for 
the post-Cold War era. 
 Although helpful for contextualizing some of the broader trends in Middle East 
policy, Calabrese and Shichor’s approaches are due for an update. I submit a paradigm for 
organizing Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East that incorporates both Calabrese’s 
focus on superpowers and Shichor’s emphasis on internal dynamics, but identifies different 
historical turning points and highlights the decision-making challenges that Beijing has faced 
when evolving sets of competing interests come into conflict with one another.  
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ARGUMENT 
 As a developing nation, the People’s Republic of China has always been constrained 
by its limited resources and influence in the world. Lacking the power to unilaterally mold 
political and economic conditions to its own advantage, China’s regional strategy in the 
Middle East has been centered on the notion of maintaining regional stability. Exactly what 
“stability” has entailed, however, has changed almost decade by decade.  
 I propose that China’s Middle East policy be organized into three main eras: the Cold 
War Period (1958-1979), the Transition Period (1980-1989), and the Post-Cold War Period 
(1990-present). Each period reflects a different Chinese understanding of how best to 
construe stability, and thus, a different set of priorities. Central to this discussion will be the 
role of economic and commercial interests in Chinese policy-making and its elevation from 
an auxiliary concern to the primary driver of foreign policy. My focus will be on the 
evolution of these eras and the events and ideological shifts that they embodied.  
 During the Cold War Period (1958-1979), China framed the United States, and later 
on, Soviet Union as existential threats. Regional stability in this context meant preventing the 
further geographical encroachment of these imperialist powers into the Gulf. China’s primary 
focus then was on cultivating good relationships with regional governments as a means of 
precluding the expansion of superpower spheres of influence. One way of cultivating strong 
political relationships was through increasing trade and economic cooperation. Accordingly, 
economics began as a mere means for attaining political goodwill. 
 The Transition Period (1980-1989) saw China’s economic interests in the region 
slowly supplant anti-superpower hedging as the primary factor in China’s regional decision-
making. This era reflected the continuation and expansion of economic relationships China 
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forged for the purposes of hedging against superpowers during the preceding period. 
Additionally, China’s policy of opening up under Deng Xiaoping and the downgraded threat 
of the Soviet Union forced a reassessment of China’s true interests in the Gulf. The case 
study of the Iran-Iraq War shows how the intra-Gulf conflict tested China’s definitions of 
regional stability by pitting Cold War considerations against economic ones. 
 In the Post-Cold War Period (1990-present), China has focused almost exclusively on 
pursuing its own economic interests in the region. Regional stability here refers to ensuring, 
to the best of China’s limited abilities, the conditions optimal for the free flow of trade and 
oil. In contrast to the Cold War Period, stability serves the purpose of securing economic 
interests. This strategy, however, is at least partially constrained by China’s need to consider 
the interests of the United States and the international community. 
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II. THE COLD WAR PERIOD (1958-1979) 
OVERVIEW: CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS 
 The first era of China’s Middle East foreign policy is entitled the Cold War Period 
because at any given point during this Period, China’s conception of regional stability meant 
precluding the expanding influence of one or both of the world’s two Cold War superpowers, 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, this title is apt because the manner in 
which China approached this goal was “Cold War” in nature. While the PRC did not directly 
or militarily engage with its superpower foes, it treated Middle Eastern nations like political 
battlegrounds, vying for political and economic relevance and attempting to supplant the 
United States and Soviet Union in influence. 
 During the early part of the Cold War Period, China viewed the United States as the 
main threat to peace in the Middle East and the world. Led by Mao Zedong, China’s 
opposition to the United States and its Gulf policies was both ideological and strategic in 
nature. China’s understanding of American motivations borrowed heavily from the Leninist 
theory that the survival of America’s capitalist economic system required that the country 
aggressively expand into the Third World to acquire the resources and foreign markets it 
desired. Mao believed that these attempts at neo-colonialism and economic enslavement 
“have taken the place of fascist Germany, Italy and Japan and are frantically preparing a new 
world war and menacing the whole world.”18 Responding to the 1956 Suez Crisis, he wrote: 
“The great contradiction is with the U.S., not Nasser. The U.S. is trying to maneuver 
Britain out of the Middle East, for it harbors sinister designs of taking over the 
Middle East…The internal contradictions of imperialism in scrambling for colonies                                                         
18 Mao Zedong, Selected Works, 4:284-285. 
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are great. We can make use of their contradictions to accomplish our ends. This is 
strategy.”19 
 
Under Mao’s “contradictions” framework, American imperialism from 1958 through the 
mid-60s had assumed the mantle of “principal contradiction.” The battle against American 
imperialism had become the single most important struggle in the worldwide communist 
movement. Only by halting American aggression against the Third World, beginning in the 
Gulf, could communism advance to the next level.20  
 The “strategy” that Mao spoke of entailed identifying and countering the methods by 
which American imperialism took advantage of economically undeveloped nations. In a 1965 
speech to the Afro-Asian Economic Seminar in Algiers, Member of the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress Nan Han-chen enumerated a litany of grievances against 
American imperialism. He concluded that in pursuing its own interests, the United States 
perpetuated forms of political and economic coercion and control largely responsible for the 
poverty and backwardness endemic to “Afro-Asian countries.”21 In summary, these included: 
 1. Military, economic, and political privileges: Americans enjoyed the establishment 
 of military bases and stationing of troops, land concessions and extraterritoriality. 
 2. Control over the branches of production and economic lifelines: The United States 
 controlled the majority of major indigenous natural resources and raw materials, 
 including minerals and, notably, oil. 
                                                        
19 Mao Zedong, “Summing Up of Provincial and Municipal Party Secretaries Conference” (Article 
written during the Conference of the Secretaries of Provincial and Municipal Party Committees, Tsingtao, 
July 1957). 
20 Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1970), 28. 
21 This designation included the Middle East within its borders. 
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 3. Control over the international market: the United States monopolized and regularly 
 manipulated world prices, arbitrarily lowering the prices of primary products and raising 
 the prices of goods sold to Afro-Asian countries. 
 4. Economic aid: The economic aid provided by the United States was an instrument for 
 extending control and exploitation over the internal affairs of recipient countries.22 
 Although Nan Han-chen refers specifically here to American influence in the Third 
World, his comments extend for the most part to the actions of the Soviet Union as well. In 
explicitly enumerating these theaters of superpower dominance, Nan Han-chen also laid out a 
battle plan by which China would seek to roll back the influence of superpowers in the Gulf. 
Since so many of these mechanisms of control were economic in nature, Nan stressed that the 
only way for Afro-Asian nations to emancipate themselves from superpower influence was to 
achieve economic independence.23 Spurring along this economic independence was to be 
China’s self-proclaimed role during the Cold War period, despite its fairly limited economic 
power at the time. As the case of Iraq shows, Chinese policies in the Middle East during the Cold 
War Period were concentrated on frustrating to the greatest extent possible these so-called 
superpower military and economic privileges, and providing alternative markets and sources of 
economic aid. Thus, during the Cold War Period, economic goals were merely a means to the 
broader goal of regional stability by preventing an increase in the superpowers’ influence. 
 During the 1960s, two factors contributed to a temporary reorientation of Chinese policy: 
Beijing’s souring relationship with Moscow, and the advent of China’s Cultural Revolution, 
which inspired the party leadership to export its revolutionary ideology abroad including to the                                                         
22 Nan Han-Chen, “For the Economic Emancipation of Afro-Asian Peoples,” Peking Review 10:5 (March 
5, 1965). 
23 Not all African and Asian countries suspected American policies of such sinister intent; in fact most 
welcomed political and economic assistance from the West. This, however, did not diminish China’s 
attempts to persuade them to the contrary. 
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Gulf. China believed it faced the twin enemies of American imperialism and Soviet 
revisionism, the threat each posed enhanced by their allegedly nefarious collusion in 
international affairs. 
 The Sino-Soviet split was rooted in Mao Zedong’s and Nikita Khrushchev’s divergent 
interpretations of Marxism and Khrushchev’s apparent moderation in his stance toward the West 
after 1957.24 While Khrushchev’s regime promoted a theory of peaceful coexistence with 
capitalist countries, Mao rejected out of hand even a modicum of detente. Although initially 
pleased by the prospect of another red ally in Beijing, Moscow grew alarmed during the 1950s at 
what it viewed as Beijing’s increasingly irresponsible and belligerent actions, such as the 
Chinese military’s shelling of offshore islands controlled by the government on Taiwan in 1958. 
For its part, the Chinese government began to accuse the Soviets of “Marxist revisionism.” Not 
only were Moscow’s desperate attempts to ensure peaceful coexistence and avoid nuclear war 
imperiling the progress of the communist movement, Beijing argued that the Soviets were 
actively scheming with the United States to dominate the world.25 Public acknowledgement of 
Sino-Soviet animosity had been kept to a minimum at first, but it exploded in 1960 when China 
criticized the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at a meeting of the World Federation of 
Trade Unions in Beijing. In response, the Soviet Union withdrew all its scientists and 
technicians, jeopardizing China’s industrialization and already faltering economy in the 
midst of the disaster caused by Mao’s Great Leap Forward experiment.26 By the mid-60s, the 
CCP openly condemned the Soviet “modern revisionist clique.” Its fears of Soviet hegemony 
seemed vindicated when the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia under the Brezhnev                                                         
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Doctrine in 1968. After this, the Soviet Union was put on equal footing with the Americans 
as a threat to global stability. China would brook neither country’s further encroachment in 
the Gulf, and Beijing reoriented its policy accordingly. 
 On a domestic level, China’s Cultural Revolution exploded in 1966 as an attempt to 
reinstate a revolutionary consciousness in the masses. In the foreign policy realm, China’s 
Cultural Revolution manifested itself as an active attempt to export revolutionary ideology 
abroad, particularly to the Third World, as part of a strategy to ensure global stability by 
neutralizing superpower influence. The Chinese viewed the Third World as particularly 
susceptible to superpower influence because it relied heavily on superpower economic aid. 
But at the same time, the Third World was also seen as a place of vulnerability – a “strategic 
rear” where imperialism could be combated with great effectiveness.27 While America’s 
malignant influence in the Gulf was long established, China now had the added task of 
countering Soviet hegemony as well. After all, the Middle East had become one of the 
principal targets of Soviet foreign policy, as Arab nations had become increasingly 
dependent on Soviet political, military, and economic support.28  
 Beginning in the late 1960s, China and the United States embarked on a path toward 
rapprochement. President Richard Nixon’s willingness to engage with the PRC culminated with 
his visit to China in 1972 and the 1972 Shanghai Communique. China believed that the United 
States would be a useful ally in balancing against the Soviet Union, which had now definitively 
replaced the United States as the primary threat to international stability. By the end of the 
1970s, the United States formally established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of 
China.                                                          
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THE SINO-IRAQI RELATIONSHIP 
A New Beginning (1958-1960) 
 Three main themes factored into Sino-Iraqi relationship during the early period of 
1958-1960: nationalism, China’s own communist ideology, and anti-imperialism. While 
China took an inconsistent stance on the first two, it was unwavering in its pursuit of the 
third. 
 Prior to the Bandung Conference, China classified the Kingdom of Iraq as part of a 
capitalist camp controlled by Western imperialism, and hence, not a potential ally in the anti-
imperialist front.29 King Faisal III was friendly to the West and had engaged Iraq in a 
security alliance with the United States and Great Britain called the Baghdad Pact. Founded 
in 1953, the Baghdad Pact’s goal was to contain the USSR by creating a line of strong states 
along the Soviets’ southwestern frontier. But on July 14, 1958, the nationalist Iraqi army 
general Abd al-Karim Qasim seized power in a military coup, overthrowing the Faisal 
monarchy and establishing the Republic of Iraq with himself as the first Prime Minister. The 
import of Qasim’s revolution was not lost on the Chinese, for they interpreted his rise to 
power as an unprecedented opportunity for China to establish itself in the Arab world. China 
extended recognition a mere two days after the revolution. Within ten days it had established 
diplomatic relations, sent its first shipment of Chinese goods, and dispatched two New China 
News Agency (NCNA, now Xinhua) correspondents to Baghdad.30  
 The timing and nature of the revolution could not have been more fortuitous. There 
were several reasons why Qasim quickly became the darling of China’s leaders. The Chinese 
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hoped that Qasim would prove to be a powerful counterpoint to Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 
Egyptian leader who consolidated Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic (UAR) 
during 1958. China made its political debut in the Gulf just at the peak of the Arab 
nationalist movement, which treated communism’s atheism and economic radicalism with 
deep suspicion. Much to Beijing’s alarm, Nasser relentlessly persecuted communists in his 
the UAR, imprisoning or exiling communists until there were hardly any left. In contrast, 
Qasim’s tolerance of the Iraqi Communist Party seemed encouraging. He not only courted 
their support, but allowed them significant influence in the Iraqi state apparatus during the 
early years of his regime.31 But China’s support for Qasim was only partially based on his 
tolerance for communism. Much more important was his firm stand against American 
imperialism.32 Beyond its reservations about Nasser’s anti-communist leanings, Beijing was 
growing apprehensive that Nasser was beginning to show an inclination to cooperate with the 
West.33 Chinese leaders hoped that the momentum of the Iraqi revolution might convince 
Nasser to rejoin them on the anti-imperialist front. If not, Qasim could serve as a new 
revolutionary leader to challenge Nasser for authority in the Arab world.34  
 Careful to frame the newly minted Sino-Iraqi friendship within the context of the 
shared crusade against imperialism, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi informed Iraqi 
Republic Foreign Minister Abdal-Jabbar Aljamer two days after the 1958 revolution: “I am 
deeply convinced that friendship and co-operation between China and Iraq and their peoples 
will develop continuously on the basis of the Bandung principles. The Chinese people will 
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exert their utmost efforts to support your just struggle against imperialism.”35 For its part, the 
new Iraqi government seemed grateful for China’s support. On July 30, Mohammed Mahdi 
Kubbah, Member of the Iraqi Sovereignty Council gushed: 
“The Arab people in general and we, the Iraqis, in particular, do not know how to thank 
People’s China for their noble and friendly attitudes toward all liberation movements in 
the Arab world. This noble attitude is certainly very impressive and important in stopping 
the aggressors, because People’s China occupies a very important position among the 
nations of the world. Its manpower and material resources are a factor which make the 
aggressors think twice before acting.”36 
 
Important here is Iraq’s tacit approval of and collaboration in the struggle against imperialism. 
Indeed, Qasim seemed to vindicate China’s hopes when he withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad 
Pact soon thereafter, leaving the Americans, as Beijing noted with amusement, a “Baghdad 
Pact with no Baghdad.” 
 Chinese leaders believed that Iraq’s sudden transformation into an “anti-imperialist 
forefront” greatly accelerated the process of total destruction of colonial forces in the Middle 
East and in the world.37 The year 1959 saw the PRC’s attempt to expand its influence in what 
it considered its pillar in the Arab world by establishing closer political, cultural, and 
economic ties.38 On April 4, both nations signed the first Sino-Iraqi cultural agreement in 
Baghdad. This provided for a wide range of cultural exchange visits by government officials, 
professors, students, journalists, language teachers, sports teams, youth organizations, and art 
troupes. The Chinese were explicit that this new Sino-Iraqi relationship be rooted “in the 
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spirit of the Bandung Conference and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.”39 To 
highlight their shared revolutionary heritage, the Chinese arranged for the first Chinese-
language movie screening in Baghdad: Tung Tsun-jui, the story of a young hero during the 
Chinese War of Liberation.40  
 Beijing was equally eager to engage Baghdad in trade deals. It is important to note, 
however, that at this time the Chinese viewed commerce not as an end in itself so much as a 
means of active resistance against Western imperialists. Countries like the United States 
were believed to intentionally manipulate markets and depress prices in order to keep Third 
World economies dependent on the West. Thus, the ultimate goal was to “see the other Asian-
African countries, as well as ourselves, prosperous, rich, and strong so as to…strengthen the 
forces against colonialism and for world peace.”41 To that end, the first Sino-Iraqi trade and 
payment agreement was signed on January 3, 1959. Under the terms of the agreement, China 
would ship Iraq raw and industrial materials such as steel, aluminum, machines parts, electrical 
materials, and industrial plant equipment, as well as textiles and luxury goods like dyestuffs, 
paints, porcelain, silk, paper, and woolen. In exchange, Iraq exported hides and skins, cotton, oil 
seeds, and tens of thousands of pounds of Zahdi dates.42 By December of that year, eight Iraqi 
delegations had visited China while three Chinese missions had journeyed to Iraq.43  
 But 1959 also presented challenges to the Sino-Iraqi relationship that would 
reverberate for another fifteen years. Although Beijing alleged that it “firmly supports every 
nationalist movement,”44 rebellions in the Mosul and Kirkuk regions of Iraq directly pitted 
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China’s commitments to nationalism and communism in the Arab world against each other. 
By February 1959, tensions came to a head between Qasim and his communist following on 
one side, and Iraqis who supported Nasser and Arab nationalism on the other. The 
nationalists sought Iraq’s incorporation into Nasser’s UAR and were led by Abd al-Wahab 
al-Shawaf, the garrison commander of the northern city of Mosul. Aware of the looming 
specter of insurrection, Qasim shrewdly provoked an outbreak of violence that he could use 
to paint the nationalists as a dangerous threat. Qasim allowed the Iraqi communist Partisans 
of Peace to hold a mass rally in Mosul, reinforced by the communist-led Popular Resistance 
militia. When the Peace Partisans began scuffling with Nasser supporters and burned down a 
pro-Nasser restaurant, Al-Shawaf responded by having his officers round up Peace Partisans 
and ordering the head of the parading communists shot, thus beginning the Mosul Revolt 
against Qasim’s government.45 
 The short-lived revolt ended with al-Shawaf’s death. Chinese responses to the event 
illustrate China’s understanding of its place in the world at the time. Where Beijing once had 
commended revolutionary action in Iraq, it now rushed to praise Qasim for the suppression 
of the Shawaf rebellion while eagerly denouncing Nasser’s alleged intervention and support 
for al-Shawaf and the Arab nationalists. What’s more, Chinese leaders attempted to frame the 
United States as somehow responsible for this mostly regional, if not domestic, squabble. 
Although it is a matter of fact that the communist rally in Mosul was ordered by Qasim 
himself, Beijing reported in the Peking Review that:  
Particular attention should be paid to the fact that Iraq’s traitors started their armed 
rebellion at Mosul just when the U.S. had signed bilateral military agreements with 
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and the Iraqi people had held a mass rally at Mosul against 
these agreements.46                                                         
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While it is true that the U.S. expressed its support for the pro-Nasser nationalists, there is no 
evidence to support China’s suggestion that the America-led forces of imperialism were the 
direct catalysts of the Shawaf insurrection. 
 The fallout of the March Mosul Revolt and another communist-inspired riot in Kirkuk in 
July did not bode well for Sino-Iraqi relations. The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) had by this time 
split into two factions: one pro-Soviet faction that supported internal and external government 
policies; and one pro-China faction that, in an ironic twist of fate, was blamed for the communist 
revolts in Mosul and Kirkuk. Although this claim was never substantiated, Qasim nonetheless 
seized the opportunity to quash all communists and preclude their increasing influence in Iraq. 
Accusing the communists of plotting to overthrow his regime, Qasim initiated a purging 
campaign by banning the ICP, closing down its offices and dismissing its members from 
government posts in the military and information and broadcasting departments. Qasim also 
accused China of supplying arms to the Iraqi communists and banned Maoist literature.47 Despite 
these setbacks, China remained nominally supportive of Iraq and Qasim, if only because of his 
commitment to anti-imperialism and the belief that China’s help was required to liberate the 
region from the sinister influence of the West.48 Thus, while China equivocated with respect to 
its support for nationalism and communism in Iraq at this time, its resolve in combating 
imperialism was unshakable. 
Challenges to the Sino-Iraqi Relationship (1960-1975) 
 Compared to 1958-1960, the next fifteen years of the Sino-Iraqi relationship were 
comparatively uneventful, encompassing some good moments but mostly trending downward.                                                         
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One explanation accounting for the cooling off of Sino-Iraqi relations during this period was 
Iraq’s domestic turbulence. Iraq during the 1960s was beset by Ba’athist Party military coups in 
1963 and 1968, as well as by insurrections by Kurdish ethnic nationalists in the north. Unsure of 
Iraq’s future direction, China was reluctant to “take sides” in a rapidly changing political milieu. 
Accordingly, Calabrese asserts that China’s lukewarm political ties to Iraq from 1960 to 1965 
might have demonstrated an exercise in caution and restraint.49 More importantly, however, this 
lull in Sino-Iraqi activity reflected Iraq’s increasing preference for and reliance on the Soviet 
Union, which was quickly becoming China’s chief rival for attention in the Middle East. China’s 
burgeoning antagonism toward the Soviet Union during the 1960s generated a new regional 
strategy: the support of revolutionary movements (particularly in Palestine and Oman), and more 
relevant to this study, the attempt to combat the forms of control enumerated by Nan Han-chen 
during his 1965 speech. China sought to roll back superpower monopolies over the resources and 
oil industry, open up alternative markets for goods and services, and serve as substitute source of 
economic aid. Consequently, the Beijing-Baghdad economic relationship forged bitterly ahead, 
even in the face of an increasingly strained political relationship.  
 The Sino-Iraqi relationship during this period was delicate. In February 1960, the Chinese 
government donated transportation and communications equipment to the Iraqi civil defense 
department, including six ambulances, six Chinese-made fire trucks, two trucks, and twenty 
radio sets.50 Baghdad dismissed these gifts by publicly contrasting them with much more 
generous American aid projects.51 This political embarrassment notwithstanding, Beijing was 
still eager to demonstrate its commercial support of the Middle Eastern country. In May 1960, a 
trade and payments agreement was signed providing that China would supply Iraq with cotton                                                         
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cloths, silks, rolled steel, and machinery. In return China would import Iraqi dates, hides, 
petroleum products, and notably, crude oil.52 
 It was at about this time that oil assumed a role as a commodity of crucial political – but 
not yet economic – consequence. That is to say, China’s oil imports during this time were 
negligible: oil’s utility primarily derived from its role as yet another example of Western 
imperialism. From 1961 to 1962, the Chinese government lent its full-throated support to the 
Iraqi government’s efforts to wrest control of its oil exports from Western corporations. The 
Chinese claimed that five U.S. oil companies controlled over 69% of the concessions areas in the 
major Middle East oil-producing countries. Thus the struggle to recapture control over oil rights 
was paramount to reclaiming national sovereignty.53 When the Iraqi government promulgated a 
law nationalizing the British, United States, and French capital-controlled Iraq Petroleum 
Company, Beijing hailed these “just actions aimed at liquidating the vestiges of colonialism and 
upholding national sovereignty.”54  
 Political turbulence in 1963 and its consequent effects on the Iraqi Communist Party 
added additional strain to the bilateral relationship. Ba’athists seized power in a military coup 
and executed Qasim in February 1963. They condemned Qasim’s communist support despite the 
uptick of persecution during the end of his regime and railed against the ICP’s use of terrorism 
and violence to paralyze the state.55 Ba’athist leaders then commenced persecution and 
extirpation of Iraqi communists on a mass-scale, eliciting a toothless Chinese government outcry 
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and demand that the suppression end.56 The new Ba’athist regime was overthrown just nine 
months later by Abd al-Salam Arif on November 18, 1963. In contrast to the Ba’athists, Arif was 
more palatable to the Chinese leadership. A strong proponent of the non-alignment movement, 
Arif maintained a neutral stance vis-à-vis both the superpowers. He found support from the CCP 
for his policy of nationalizing key industrial and manufacturing enterprises and expanding 
relations with other non-aligned countries.57 The Chinese government seized this opportunity to 
transform Iraq into a theater of Sino-Soviet rivalry, hoping to promote its relationship with the 
nascent Arif regime and to foreclose the possibility of any additional Soviet influence in the 
country. China denounced the pro-Soviet faction of the ICP as enemies of the Arif regime and 
blamed their adherence to Khrushchev’s revisionist line as the catalyst for the deaths during the 
Mosul and Kirkuk incidents in 1959.58 In response, the Soviets charged that “the Chinese 
representatives in Iraq wanted to take advantage of the fact that the Iraqi communist party had 
become leaderless to create their own schismatic group there.”59 China’s disenchantment with 
the Qasim and Ba’athist regimes is evidence that the harsh treatment of Iraqi communists was a 
bone of contention in Sino-Iraqi relations during the early 60s. But that was not China’s primary 
concern. In fact, the CCP’s subordination of the communist question to the goodwill of Sino-
Iraqi relations indicates that China had prioritized combating the Soviet Union above all else. 
China’s actions suggest that it viewed the issue of communist persecution in the same way that it 
viewed the significance of the question of oil in the 1960s.  
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 Sino-Iraqi relations deteriorated around the time of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when 
China became convinced that it could no longer work with the Iraqi government. Abd al-Salam 
Arif had died in 1966 and was replaced by his brother Abd al-Rahman Arif, who attempted to 
strengthen ties with the West. In the eyes of the Chinese, the so-called Six Day War was 
tantamount to an egregious display of American imperialism. It saw the Soviet attempt to make 
peace in the UN as reflecting their collusion with the U.S. in a joint scheme to achieve 
worldwide domination. In opposition to the United States and its backing of Israel, the Chinese 
denounced Israel’s status as a “made up” state and reaffirmed their unconditional support for the 
Arab world. After the fighting commenced on June 5, the Chinese government immediately 
condemned the war as “another towering crime against the Arab people committed by U.S. 
imperialism and its tool Israel as well as a grave provocation against the people of Asia, Africa, 
and the rest of the world.”60  
 But as fearful as the CCP was of American aggression, it was equally abhorrent of the 
actions of its Kremlin rivals. Although the Soviets were committed to their Arab allies, they were 
still loath to see unnecessary violence in the Gulf if it could be prevented. On May 27, the Soviet 
prime minister indicated to the American president that if the United States intervened in an 
Arab-Israeli war, so too would the Soviet Union; but if the United States stayed out of the war, 
the Soviets would refrain as well.61 As part of a Cultural Revolution-inspired revolutionary 
foreign policy, Beijing had embraced a policy of supporting Arab allies and more forceful 
resistance against the United States. Beijing was incensed by Moscow’s “two-faced behavior,” 
particularly when the Soviet Union introduced Security Council draft resolutions from June 7 to                                                         
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June 9 calling for the belligerent nations to ceasefire. For Beijing, this was unimpeachable 
evidence of the Soviet revisionist line, as the Soviets clearly disagreed with the Chinese that this 
war and the state of Israel were mere vehicles of U.S. aggression. In short, the Chinese 
leadership were convinced that: 
Through its treachery and capitulation, the Soviet revisionist clique not only aims at 
working in league with U.S. imperialism to put out the anti-U.S. conflagration in the 
Arab lands, but also intends to strike a deal with Washington at the expense of the Arab 
people—all in pursuit of the counter-revolutionary line of Soviet-U.S. collaboration for 
world domination.62 
 
 In addition, the Chinese were upset that the war seemed to merely draw the Soviet Union 
and Arab countries – including China’s formerly number one ally, Iraq – closer together. During 
and in the aftermath of the Six Day War, the Soviets attempted to curry favor with Arab 
countries by providing military support. Although Iraqi forces did not fight in the war, its troops 
were stationed in Jordan and Syria on a long-term basis, and anti-Zionist sentiment propelled 
Iraq’s increased arms purchases.63  The first Soviet shipment to Iraq included ten MiG-21s and 
two trainer planes; within ten days of the conflict, the Soviet Union had provided 325 fighter 
planes, 300 tanks, and artillery and equipment to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.64  Following the 1967 
war, China became convinced that it would be problematic to work with the Iraqi government, 
which to the CCP’s consternation had since grown even more dependent on the Soviet Union for 
political and technical support.65 And even though the 1967 war had provided Beijing with the 
opportunity both to castigate the Soviet Union’s alleged betrayal of Arabs and warn of America’s 
nefarious schemes, Beijing seemed to have the odds stacked against it.66 China’s focus in the                                                         
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next few years would be on providing material, political, and technical support to other 
revolutionary movements in the region.67 
 During the 1970s, China saw the Soviet Union replacing the United States as the greatest 
threat to regional and world stability. Realizing the danger that a Soviet-controlled Iraq could 
pose to the region, China’s objective in Iraq from 1970-1975 was to prevent total Iraqi 
dependence on the Soviet Union. Although their political relationship was worse than ever, 
China began to welcome some of Iraq’s more radical foreign policy positions regarding the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq’s support of extreme Palestinian organizations.68 More 
importantly, Beijing sought to win Baghdad’s favor through enticing economic deals. In 1971, 
China and Iraq signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. The agreement 
called for Iraq to import sulfur while exporting chemical fertilizer to China; included also was a 
provision that China would grant Iraq a $36 million interest-free loan, repayable over ten years, 
with the start of repayment deferred until 1984.69  
 China’s renewed approach, however, did little to turn Iraq against its Soviet partner, as a 
fifteen-year Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty signed in April 1972 led once again to the cooling in 
China’s relationship with Iraq. In sum, China’s relationship with Iraq in the period 1960-1975 
was fraught with complications arising from a mixture of Iraqi domestic turbulence and Iraq’s 
preference for relations with both superpowers rather than China. Clearly, China’s foreign policy 
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objectives here were hobbled by China’s limited material capabilities, and it was unable to 
induce Iraq to share its ideological view of the world. That is not to say that this period had no 
effect on the development of China’s regional policy. This was the era when Beijing began to see 
that its definition of stability – that is, hedging against superpower influence – rested heavily on 
economics, oil, and trade. Beijing would increasingly exploit those factors as policy tools.  
Renewed Relationship (1975-1979) 
 In this last stage of the Cold War Period, China continued its policy of expanding 
economic ties with Iraq for the purposes of improving the political atmosphere between the two 
countries. The ultimate goal was still displacing the Soviet Union’s patronage. Two factors 
accounted for the resurgence of Sino-Iraqi relations beginning in 1975: friction between the 
Soviet Union and Iraq, and Iraq’s peace accord with Iran. Once again, these catalysts reflect the 
complex web of international relations of the Cold War world, wherein exogenous circumstances 
often affected China’s bilateral relationships in the region. During this time, Moscow was 
attempting to isolate Egypt’s Anwar Sadat, who had steadily grown closer to the United States. 
Iraq’s rapprochement with Egypt, in addition to its growing rivalry with the Ba’athist regime in 
Syria, caused Moscow to temporarily limit arms deliveries to Baghdad.70 
 China struck while the iron was hot, aiming to enhance Sino-Iraqi ties during a period of 
strained Soviet-Iraqi relations. In July 1975, Iraq’s Vice-President Mohyiddin Marouf visited 
Beijing. Deng Xiaoping graciously welcomed Vice-President Marouf and in a state banquet 
speech, praised the Iraqi people’s persistence in combating imperialism and colonialism, 
enjoined all Gulf countries to resolve their differences to prevent foreign intervention, and spoke 
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of a new era in Sino-Iraqi friendship.71 The visit marked a new stage in bilateral relations indeed. 
The early 70s had already established a strong economic orientation for Sino-Iraqi cooperation. 
This period continued the trend by deepening the relationship, particularly in the construction 
and trade industries. 
 Starting in 1975, China negotiated and began working on large-scale construction 
projects to enhance Sino-Iraqi comity. The largest of these was the construction of the 667-meter 
Mosul Bridge I, which linked the Baghdad-Mosul highway to an international road connecting 
Mosul to Turkey. In addition, the Chinese agreed to build a sports hall in Baghdad during 1976 
as part of a new economic and technical agreement and completed a washing and spinning mill 
in Kifri during July 1978. In August of that year, China also signed a protocol on the 
construction of the Sherquat highway bridge on the Tigris in northern Iraq.72 These projects were 
the first steps in a long-term trend of offering Chinese expertise and labor on projects that would 
benefit Iraq’s economy. 
 Bilateral trade also flourished. By 1975, trade relations had reached a new point, with 
total volume of trade 8.5 times larger than that of 1973, and almost $60 million higher than that 
of 1974.73 In 1977, both countries signed a trade agreement, whereby Iraq would supply the PRC 
with 100,000 tons of sulfur and chemical fertilizer.74 China also purchased over 100,000 tons of 
Iraqi dates, thereby becoming Iraq’s largest importer of the product.75 The sheer volume of 
China’s trade in dates suggests that the importation of this commodity went beyond mere 
satisfaction of demand. It was at least partially a calculation on the part of the CCP to enhance 
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bilateral relations by playing to strengths in the Iraqi agricultural market. It is important to note 
that during this time, foreign imports were still meant to play an auxiliary, rather than primary, 
role in China’s development. Thus, Sino-Iraqi economic cooperation reflected China’s foreign 
policy goals rather than economic self-interest.76 
CONCLUSION 
China’s preoccupation with the threat posed by superpowers was all-consuming during 
the Cold War Period. Indeed, virtually all the CCP’s decisions regarding the Middle East can be 
viewed through this lens. In sum, the employment of economics as a tool for political and 
strategic goals is what delineates the Cold War Period from the next two eras of Chinese foreign 
policy. Also worth noting is that despite China’s often-vocal support for or opposition to 
developments in the Gulf, China’s capabilities were still limited during the Cold War Period. 
China possessed neither the political or economic wherewithal to effect much real change in the 
region. The prioritization of economic interests began during the Transition Period that roughly 
coincided with Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power in 1978. Gradually, the PRC would begin to exert 
influence concomitant with its own growing power and wealth over the next decade. 
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III. THE TRANSITION PERIOD (1980-1988) 
OVERVIEW: CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS 
 The Transition Period marked not only China’s growing influence in the Gulf region, but 
a fundamental recalculation of its interests and how to secure them. On the one hand, China 
could not totally discard its fear of the Soviet Union and superpower hegemony. But on the 
other, this concern was overshadowed by the unprecedented volume of trade, labor and 
contracting deals, and most importantly, arms sales that Beijing was conducting with Middle 
East states. Although Beijing continued to publicly assert its opposition to superpower influence 
and contended that any disruption to regional peace would open the door to superpower 
intervention, Beijing’s actions spoke louder than its words. The case of the Iran-Iraq War will 
show that by the mid-80s China had more or less abandoned the balance-of-power logic it 
employed against the superpowers during the Cold War Period. Instead it prioritized the benefits 
of trade and commercial relations with both Iraq and Iran. Essentially, Chinese Gulf policy 
during the 1980s saw a transition from economic tools as a lubricant for political relationships to 
economics becoming a major consideration in its own right. In foreign as in domestic policy, 
China’s definition of “stability” during the 1980s experienced profound transition. 
 Two main factors account for this evolution over the decade: the perception that the 
Soviet Union was weakening and the China’s increasing preoccupation with domestic economic 
modernization.77 The protracted war in Afghanistan from 1979-1989 is often referred to as “the 
Soviet Union’s Vietnam.” The war mired the Soviet Union in a messy decade-long conflict and 
in the process sapped the USSR of resources and morale. The Soviet Union’s repeated military                                                         
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setbacks against the mujahedeen, its high casualty count, its loss of valuable military equipment, 
and generally disintegrating control over the Afghan political regime caused China to label 
Afghanistan, with quite a bit of tongue-in-cheek, the “quagmire that consumes human and 
material resources.”78 The United States’ similar experience in Vietnam convinced the Chinese 
leadership that neither superpower posed the same level of threat to international security or 
Chinese interests as they did in the preceding era. In addition, Chinese analysts believed that a 
rise in multipolarity, advances in military technology, and a strategic balance between the 
superpowers made the prospect of global war less likely. Although the potential threat of 
superpower hegemonism still existed, China had shed its obsession with the military security 
concerns of a hedging strategy and was moving the world towards a “new international economic 
order.”79 
  Deng Xiaoping’s administration shifted the PRC’s focus toward an agenda of 
pragmatism and an emphasis on material incentives with the ultimate goal of modernizing China. 
Beginning in 1978, China pursued a policy of enlivening the domestic economy and opening up 
to the outside. Economic modernization was designed to raise China’s standard of living, reverse 
the damage of the Cultural Revolution, and equip China for an enhanced position on the global 
stage. Not surprisingly, the combination of these factors – the perceived decline of the Soviet 
Union and China’s focus on economic modernization – prompted a new approach to global 
politics. 
 The enunciation of China’s “Independent Foreign Policy” in 1982 sought to strengthen 
China’s unity with the Third World and to progressively improve relations with both the Soviet 
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Union and the United States. The CCP’s new attitude toward both countries was neatly captured 
by Premier Zhao Ziyang’s statement to the National People’s Congress: 
We take a principled stand in handling our relations with the United States and the 
Soviet Union. We will not refrain from improving relations with them because we 
opposed their hegemonism, nor will we give up our anti-hegemonist stand 
because we want to improve relations with them, nor will we try to improve our 
relations with one of them at the expense of the other.80 
 
Central to this new foreign policy was a renewed emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence outlined at Bandung in 1955. The Five Principles’ focus on sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs, 
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence meshed well with Beijing’s newfound 
attitude of neutrality on the global stage. In favoring neither superpower, the Chinese hoped to 
produce the peaceful international environment needed for trade relations that would in turn 
generate domestic modernization and growth.81 But it is crucial to understand that China was not 
interested in peace as a general matter; after all, China actually benefited from the war between 
Iraq and Iran. Rather, the “world peace” that China sought was couched specifically in terms of 
the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the United States. It simply meant both superpowers’ 
relative non-interference with Chinese conduct in the Gulf.  
 Despite Beijing’s renewed commitment to the health of its bilateral relationships with the 
U.S. and USSR, it was careful to reserve the right to oppose hegemonism if necessity forced its 
hand. Indeed, speeches by Chinese leadership on the Independent Foreign Policy always paid lip 
service to this perennial objective. In April of 1982, Zhao Ziyang summarized China’s foreign 
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policy goals in the same breath as “opposing hegemonism and maintaining world peace.”82 
Foreign Minister Huang Hua’s October address to the UN General Assembly stressed China’s 
willingness to “unite with countries of the Third World and join hands with all other countries 
and forces working for peace to combat hegemonism and maintain world peace.”83 But the 
parameters of what constituted hegemony and how China would respond to it experienced a 
subtle shift. During the 1960s and 70s, the expansion of either superpower’s political and 
economic ties with Middle East states was ipso facto “hegemony.” Now, however, China’s 
emphasis on economic growth meant that the CCP was practically willing to turn a blind eye to 
the actions of the Soviets and the Americans – so long as neither jeopardized China’s 
modernization efforts. Thus, China’s objection to superpower hegemony during the Transition 
Period was mostly a rhetorical tool.  
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980-1988) 
Background 
 To the West, the Iran-Iraq War remains the oft-forgotten Gulf War. The conflict failed to 
draw much attention from Western powers until 1987, when fighting threatened to cut off the 
flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz. Only then did the international community take 
serious steps in the United Nations to end the conflict. But for China, the Iran-Iraq War was a 
critical juncture in the development of its Gulf policy. Although China publicly expressed its 
fears that the war might permit the resurgence of superpower interference in the Gulf, it in fact 
profited from the internecine conflict. 
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 The Iran-Iraq War commenced on September 22, 1980 when Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi 
forces invaded Iran in an attempt to seize the Khuzestan Province. Iran under the rule of 
Ayatollah Khomeini had made it a priority to export its revolutionary Shia ideology abroad. 
Khomeini singled out Iraq in particular as a target, as he believed he could appeal to Iraq’s 
oppressed Shia majority to overthrow Saddam’s Sunni regime.84 The new Iranian regime no 
longer felt bound by the 1975 Algiers Accord85, and openly called on Iraq’s Shia citizens to 
launch a jihad against Saddam’s regime. Saddam took this threat seriously, sensitive as he was to 
the longstanding unrest amongst Iraq’s Shia population. Additionally, the Khuzestan Province 
appealed to Saddam for multiple reasons. First, the region was a lucrative source of oilfields. 
Second, nationalism came into play, as the area contained a sizable population of Arab 
inhabitants. Third, Khuzestan seemed easy to capture, given its position on the Iraqi side of the 
Zagros Mountains. Saddam believed that in seizing the province, he would spark a new 
revolution in Iran that would empower a new regime friendlier to Iraq’s interests. In this way, 
Saddam would be able to seize Iran’s oil and eliminate an existential threat in one blow.86 The 
campaign did not go as planned and both countries remained mired in a war of attrition for close 
to a decade. 
 The war presented the CCP with a dilemma since both nations were considered friendly 
to China. Public statements on the war issued from Beijing, however, were somewhat 
misleading, as they suggested a tone of concern that obscured Beijing’s true intentions. 
Throughout the war, China maintained three official objectives as enumerated by Zhao Ziyang 
the day after the outbreak of fighting: 1) the conflict would be resolved peacefully through                                                         
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negotiations; 2) the conflict would remain free of superpower intervention; and 3) the situation 
would not deteriorate. Zhao hoped that these objectives would not only serve the interests of the 
people of Iran and Iraq, but that they would be “conducive to peace and stability in the Gulf 
area.”87 But in practice, China seemed little concerned with any of these objectives. Despite 
being the only country on the UN Security Council enjoying warm relations with both Iraq and 
Iran, China was not invested in negotiating for peace. Beijing sponsored no initiatives to resolve 
the war; nor did it seek leadership in multilateral organizations with influence in the Gulf such as 
the Non-aligned Movement and the Group of 77.88 Still, over the course of 1980, Beijing 
reiterated its firm commitment to the three enumerated principles. During a visit to Yemen, Vice-
Premier Ji Pengfei delivered a press statement reaffirming that “China maintains friendly 
relations with both Iraq and Iran. We sincerely hope that the armed conflicts will be settled 
through peaceful consultations. Superpower attempts to meddle and interfere should be guarded 
against.”89 Still, Beijing’s ostensible fear of the escalating war should be taken with a grain of 
salt. In fact, it is the case that China’s interests were extremely well served by and during the 
Iran-Iraq War.  
 Given China’s all-consuming focus on economic modernization, one might at first be 
inclined to assume that the instability attending regional warfare would harm China’s bilateral 
economic relationship with Iraq. This was patently not the case. Throughout the war, China 
greatly expanded the labor and contracting industries it had built in Iraq during the late 70s. By 
1987, just one year before the war’s conclusion, Iraq had become China’s number one market for 
labor export, valued at $657.67 million. Iraq had also become Beijing’s number one market for                                                         
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contracted projects and was valued at $670.04 million.90 From 1979 to 1986, close to 20,000 
Chinese laborers were assigned to 143 projects in Iraq.91 Although China’s construction projects 
during the late 70s were limited to the provision of cheap and efficient labor, after 1981, the size 
and volume of China’s construction projects swelled prodigiously. For example, in addition to 
constructing electric power plants, docks, petroleum refineries, and large residential projects, the 
PRC Construction Corporation completed the Kifil Shinafiya irrigation project in 1987  – then 
China’s largest irrigation project in the Gulf – alone valued at an unprecedented $174 million.92 
Altogether, China garnered $1.328 billion purely from its labor and contracting deals in Iraq 
during the 1980s.93 In addition, China and Iraq continued to sign deals on trade and joint 
economic and technical cooperation. These included a 1980 agreement for China’s importation 
of Iraqi nitrogenous fertilizers worth $46 million, and an agreement in 1985 providing for 
Chinese importation of Iraqi phosphate, sulfur, and palm dates and Iraqi importation of Chinese 
textiles, industrial, metal, and mineral products.94 Clearly, China profited greatly during the 
entire eight years that Iraq was at war, despite the CCP’s steadfast insistence that economic 
modernization might be imperiled by war in the Gulf. It would appear that despite its public 
protestations, China’s economic modernization was in fact materially unaffected, if not abetted, 
during the war. Although Chinese construction and labor projects flourished during this time, the 
revenue gained from these conventional forms of commerce paled in comparison to the sum 
China earned through arms deals with Iran and Iraq during the period.                                                          
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Motivations and Origin of the Arms Trade 
 At the Plenary Meeting of the 35th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 
1980, Huang Hua announced China’s deep concern over the recent military conflict and its hope 
that “the two parties will cease hostilities speedily and settle their disputes through peaceful 
negotiations so as not to be exploited by those harbouring ulterior motives.”95 Huang’s warning 
against exploitation refers implicitly to the world superpowers, which might have seized this 
opportunity to intervene militarily under the pretense of restoring order. Still, it is difficult to 
parse through the dense web of possible Chinese motives during this time: was China really 
fearful of further superpower encroachment into the Gulf, or was the CCP’s insistence on 
nonintervention mere kabuki obscuring China’s more important economic interests? After all, 
despite its objections to the war, China became a top arms dealer to both belligerents throughout 
the 80s. During the Cold War Period, China distributed weapons and military technology free of 
charge to revolutionary movements in the Gulf; but during the Transition Period, China gladly 
sold arms to those willing to pay. Most China analysts agree that both strategic and economic 
motivations factored into China’s decision to commence arms sales to the Gulf during the 80s. 
The question, then, is whether the CCP assigned equal weight to both concerns, or whether it 
valued one over the other. Two main theories explain China’s actions during this period. 
Strategic Explanation 
 Ample evidence suggests that China’s arms sales in the Middle East may have begun as a 
means to combat Soviet influence in the region. Although it is true that China was reassured by 
the outcome of the Soviet war in Afghanistan because it distracted the Soviet Union and sapped 
its resources, this was only evident in the latter half of the decade. When Soviet boots first 
stepped into Afghanistan, the Chinese reacted with indignation and alarm, roundly criticizing the                                                         
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invasion as hegemonistic, a gross interference in regional affairs, and a wanton violation of 
international norms.96 The invasion sparked a new sense of urgency for containing Soviet 
influence. In response to this perceived threat, the PRC attempted to engage more closely with 
Middle Eastern regimes.97 
 Diplomatically, it normalized relations with all major regional governments with the 
exception of Saudi Arabia and Israel. China buttressed these diplomatic overtures by 
strengthening military ties. Just as China sought to present itself as an alternative market to the 
United States for goods and services during the Cold War Period, it returned to this reasoning by 
presenting itself as an alternative market for Soviet weapons. PRC-manufactured arms for export 
were practically clones of Soviet-designed weaponry – they were often just like Soviet 
technology, operated similarly, and frequently even contained interchangeable parts.98 The 
production of these weapons and weapons parts made China an easy alternative for former 
Soviet clients. On the whole, however, this argument is less compelling, as China’s conduct 
indicates that it was less worried by the prospect of a resurgent Soviet Union and more 
concerned with general economic growth. The strategic explanation might account for China’s 
actions during the early part of the Iran-Iraq War; but by 1984, this rationale was subsumed by 
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Economic Explanation 
 First and foremost, China’s overriding motivation during the Iran-Iraq war was breaking 
into the global arms bazaar and selling weapons.99 With the outbreak of the war, China had 
found two willing customers. If its arms sales to both sides prolonged the length of the conflict, 
China had essentially acquired a ready-made market that would boost the PRC’s economic 
prosperity. The PRC was particularly well positioned to take advantage of Iraq and Iran’s needs, 
as Western weapons were too expensive and often accompanied by political conditions and 
unwelcome moralizing. Both clients were well served by China’s specialty: large quantities of 
inexpensive basic ammunitions.100 
 Another perspective on the increased arms sales emphasizes China’s financial goals and 
burdens at the time. Deng Xiaoping’s “Four Modernizations” campaign catalyzed China’s arms 
trade with Iraq and Iran. Enunciated at the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 
December 1978, Deng’s Four Modernizations were intended to make China a great economic 
power by the middle of the 21st century.101 Of the four, Deng’s Third Modernization focused 
specifically on national security and the People’s Liberation Army. Given the downgraded threat 
posed by the United States and Soviet Union, Deng placed defense modernization low on the list 
of priorities, such that the portion of Chinese gross national income devoted to defense was 
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scheduled to fall from 17.5% to 7.4% by 1989.102 These radical reductions to the power, size, 
responsibility, and funding of the defense industry threatened to make the PLA a financial 
liability. In order to remain economically viable, the defense establishment, which included the 
PLA and military production factories, needed to commercialize their products and find a way to 
earn revenue.103 Enterprises primarily devoted to the production of weapons and items of defense 
saw two ways to raise funds: converting excess capacity to the production of civilian goods, and 
selling to the international market whatever defense items were in excess of the quota provided 
to the PLA.104 Any revenue gained was shared between the central government and the parent 
production ministry of the factory for housing, worker benefits, salary increases, capital 
investment, and research and development.105   
 The independent prerogatives of the PLA in this effort should not be discounted: given its 
reduced priority under the Deng administration, the PLA’s leadership had deep reservations 
about its role in China’s new society. The additional revenue it earned from arms sales promised 
both a substantially larger degree of autonomy as well as validation of its achievements.106 
Although such arms sales were initially rooted in exigency, PLA leaders soon realized that the 
trade was a profitable way to further military modernization. Greater overall revenue and lower 
per-unit costs could be realized if arms factories produced new weapons for export in addition to 
merely selling excess products. Support for these efforts might also have reflected the fact that 
the Ministry of Finance received part of the funds (which were added to the nation’s hard-
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currency reserves), and some key individuals earned what were basically sales commissions on 
their deals.107 
Arms Sales to Iraq and Iran 
Overview: China and Arms Sales to the Third World  
From 1950-1980, the United States and Soviet Union dominated the arms market in the 
Middle East. From 1976-1980, just before Chinese arms transfers commenced, the entire value 
of arms transfers to the Middle East reached $38.6 billion, or 35% of the world’s total. Of these 
arms transfers, the United States and its allies alone constituted $22.7 billion, or almost 60% of 
total transfer agreements to the Middle East.108 The Soviet Union comprised most of the rest, 
leaving the Chinese share too negligible for mention or even measurement. But by the end of the 
decade, China ranked fifth in the world in the value of arms transfer agreements to the Third 
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Fig. 1 – Arms Transfer Agreements with the Third World, 1981-1988 
Leading Suppliers Compared (in millions of 1990 US dollars) 
 
Source: Richard Grimmett, "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major 
Supplier, 1976-1983," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1984). 
 
 
Fig. 2 – Arms Transfer Deliveries with the Third World, 1981-1988  
Leading Suppliers Compared (in millions of 1990 US dollars) 
 
Source: Richard Grimmett, "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major 
Supplier, 1976-1983," (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1984). 
 
 
During the early Cold War Period, most of China’s support for Third World regimes was 
rhetorical in nature. Even at the height of the Cultural Revolution’s Revolutionary Foreign 
Policy, the military and economic assistance the PRC rendered was paltry in comparison to what 
China could offer by the 1980s through its arms deals. Even so, looking at the sheer volume of 
the arms transfer market that China commanded in comparison to the Soviet Union might lead 
one to believe that the PRC’s influence was negligible – after all, the Soviet Union delivered 
more than ten times the amount of weapons to the Third World from 1981-1988.  
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Given China’s still-weak economic foundation, it could not hope to surpass the Soviet 
Union in sheer volume of arms transfers. But the Iran-Iraq War did help China to make 
appreciable headway in closing this gap through trade with Iraq and Iran, which comprised 
61.3% of all China’s arms transfer agreements with the Third World from 1981-1988. 111 Both 
belligerents were in desperate need of arms suppliers and willing to patronize major suppliers 
like the Soviet Union and minor ones like the PRC. China saw this as a golden opportunity to 
increase its political and economic relevance. Arms sales during the Iran-Iraq War made up over 
one-fifth of all arms transfer agreements by suppliers to the Third World during 1981-1988.112 
China’s arms sales during the Iran-Iraq War increased its regional role relative to the Soviet 
Union. From 1981-1988, the PRC’s share of the value of all arms transfer agreements with Iran 
and Iraq collectively was 15%. The Soviet Union’s share of arms transfer agreements was 32%, 
slightly over twice as much.113 This is further corroborated by the data concerning China’s arms 
transfer deliveries to Iraq and Iran. Combined, China’s share of all arms deliveries to Iraq and 
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Fig. 3 – Value of Arms Deliveries to Iran and Iraq, 1981-1988 
Source: Rachel Schmidt, “Global Arms Exports to Iraq, 1960-1990,” RAND (1991). 
  
These comparisons with the Soviet Union notwithstanding, it is important to question to 
what degree China’s motivations here were rooted in strategic rather than economic 
considerations. It is tempting to interpret this apparent arms race with the Soviet Union in the 
Middle East as a sublimated form of competition. However, it is more likely the case that these 
sales demonstrated China’s attempts to seize a spot in the global arms bazaar that had been 
vacated or neglected by the Soviets. 
Tilting Toward Iraq (1980-1983) 
 During the early part of the Iran-Iraq War, China provided more military support to Iraq 
than it did to Iran. This “tilt,” as it were, was not undertaken out of a conscious preference for the 
regime of Saddam Hussein. Instead, it was a natural result of the opportunities presented to the 
Chinese. From the end of the 1967 Six Day War until 1978, virtual all of Iraq’s armament was 
procured from the Soviet Union. Owing to an increasingly strained relationship with the Soviets 
during the mid-1970s, Iraq sought to diversify the countries from which it bought its weapons in 
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the hope that this would reduce the amount of leverage that any one country could exert over its 
internal policies. In addition, like the Chinese, the Iraqis reacted very strongly to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Although Saddam’s regime had been the happy recipient of 
Soviet aid for many years, physical incursion by Soviet troops into the Gulf worried Saddam, 
who feared this invasion might set a further precedent permitting additional invasions into his or 
other nations. Soviet-Iraqi relations collapsed shortly thereafter: in January 1980, Iraq voted in 
favor of a UN resolution condemning the Soviet invasion and demanding an immediate removal 
of Soviet forces.114 In response, the Soviet Union embargoed any arms transfers to Iraq 
beginning in 1980 until 1982. Since Baghdad was in need of a new supplier to upkeep its costly 
war with Iran, it turned to Beijing for assistance. 
 Chinese leaders initially denied having sold munitions directly to either Iran or Iraq. 
Strictly speaking, this was true. When the Iran-Iraq War first broke out, Chinese leaders called 
for a peaceful end to the fighting, restraint by both sides, and non-involvement by outside 
powers. In keeping with the moral high ground they had claimed (and to avoid angering other 
Arab governments hostile to Iran), top CCP officials decided that Chinese entities should not sell 
munitions directly to either country.115 Instead, China sold weapons through several intermediary 
countries. Jordan served as the major hub for arms transfers to Iraq. Unclassified International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) trade statistics on Chinese exports, for example, reveal that although 
China exported next to nothing to Jordan in 1981, the value of exports to Jordan soared to $1.32 
billion in 1982, $1.53 billion in 1983, and $1.26 billion in 1984. Similarly, Syria and North 
Korea were the major intermediaries for Chinese munitions sales to Iran.116 In this way, the                                                         
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Chinese government could easily deny contradicting its own edict about neutrality toward both 
parties. Throughout the war, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian continued to deny as “groundless” 
U.S. allegations that China was selling arms to both Iraq and Iran.117 The government also 
denied knowledge of the accidental transfers of weapons to the belligerent countries. When 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesman Ma Yuzhen was pressed on the transfer of 
weapons to Iran and Iraq, he replied: “the international arms market is very complicated. 
Therefore, we have no way of finding out how other countries procure their weapons from this 
market.”118 
 According to the U.S. government, in total China signed arms agreements with Iraq 
worth approximately $3.6 billion during the period 1980-1983.119 Given the covert nature of 
these dealings, it is only possible to surmise the total volume of arms transfers; however, the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that Chinese sales to Iraq 
during this period included approximately 2500 tanks, 130 fighter aircraft, 650 armored 
personnel carriers, and 100 towed multiple rocket launchers. Many of these shipments were 
delivered through Egypt or Jordan, or otherwise assembled and produced in Iraq itself (see 
Appendix 2).120  
Uptick in Sales to Iran (1984-1987) 
 Although China’s arms agreements with Iran totaled only $505 million from 1980-1983, 
from 1984 until the end of the war, China’s arms agreements with Iran totaled $2.5 billion.121 
Concurrently, the latter half of the war saw a relative decline in the volume of arms transfers 
from China to Iraq. It is unclear what exactly accounted for this pivot toward Iran in China’s                                                         
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arms sales. One possible theory is that China was responding to a shift in Moscow’s policies 
toward Iran and Iraq. Moscow intended to forge closer relations with Teheran during the early 
part of the war; it is reasonable to think that this was one impetus for Moscow’s severing of 
relations with Baghdad in 1980. But after attempts at improving the Soviet-Iranian relationship 
proved fruitless, Moscow resumed its arms sales to Baghdad and ended sales to Iran.122 China 
may have seized this opportunity to shore up relations with the new Iranian regime, especially to 
compensate for its close relations with the Shah up until 1979. In any case, anti-Soviet hedging 
considerations probably played no more than a marginal role in this shift toward Iran; instead, it 
was motivated by a glaring vacancy in the Iranian arms market. This economic explanation is 
lent credence by the Reagan administration’s Operation Staunch, the 1983 arms embargo against 
the Islamic Republic by the United States and its allies as part of the West’s “tilt toward Iraq.” 
Now that Iran was no longer able to obtain weapons from the United States or its allies, China 
filled a much-needed void.  
 In April 1983, a high-level Iranian delegation allegedly made a secret visit to Beijing, 
where they purportedly conducted a $1.3 billion arms transfer deal with the Chinese; North 
Korea served as the intermediary.123 Two additional agreements were signed in 1985. The first 
was worth $1 billion was signed in Tehran by Zhang Jingfu and Iranian chief of staff Ismail 
Suhrabi. It stipulated that China would deliver an arsenal of Chinese-made Soviet clones, 
including aircraft, tanks, artillery, rocket launchers, and surface-to-air missiles to Iran in 
exchange for payment in hard currency and oil shipments over a period of two years.124 The 
second deal was signed in June 1985 and reportedly worth $1.16 billion, with a Hong Kong-                                                        
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based firm headed by a British national serving as an intermediary for the sale. Another arms 
sales contract reportedly worth $3.1 billion was concluded in 1986. Significantly, this deal 
provided Iran with HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship cruise missiles that allowed it to strike effectively at 
oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s possession of these Chinese-made missiles ultimately 
brought America into the fray, as will be explained below. The last known agreement was 
concluded in 1987 and included Chinese construction of several factories to produce rockets, 
artillery, helicopters, and ammunition. In short, arms sales constituted the most important 
element of the Sino-Iranian partnership during the 1980s and went a long way toward the 
normalization of relations following the 1979 Iranian revolution.125  
From 1981-1988 China conducted approximately $3.9 billion in arms transfer agreements 
with Iran, and $5.52 billion with Iraq.126 With respect to both countries, China made significant 
headway in establishing itself as a politically and economically relevant partner during the 
1980s. Although China still lagged far behind the Soviet Union and other countries in the total 
share of arms agreements with Iraq, it still commanded 12% of arms agreements by 1988 (Fig. 
4). This is impressive, given that Iraq was one of the Soviet Union’s largest client states, and 
given that the PRC conducted little to no arms deals with Iraq before the 1980s. China’s arms 
trade strategy was particularly effective in Iran, where it took advantage of Moscow’s stale 
relations with Tehran to own 23% of the value of arms agreements during the decade (Fig. 4), 
becoming Iran’s dominant supplier of weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.127 
 
                                                         
125 Ibid. 
126 Grimmett, "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1976-
1983," 47-48. 
127 Schmidt, “Global Arms Exports to Iraq, 1960-1990,” 12. 
Lee | 55 
 
Fig. 4 – Share of Arms Transfer Agreements, 1981-1988 
 
Source: Richard Grimmett, "Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major 
Supplier, 1976-1983" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1984). 
 
Analysis: United States Involvement and Conclusion of War (1987-1988) 
 Although Beijing conducted these arms deals with relative impunity during the first six 
years of the conflict, the last two years saw Beijing’s heightened concern as the threat of US and 
Soviet involvement increased. Initially, Washington’s general antipathy toward both countries 
ensured that it did nothing to stand in the way of the fighting. Washington observed with barely-
concealed glee as both states checked each other, producing a sort of fragile balance of power in 
the Gulf. And while war between the two Gulf countries in and of itself did not really concern 
Washington, the war’s potential to negatively impact the free flow of oil did. 
By 1987, the United States possessed fairly conclusive proof that the Chinese had been 
supplying Iran and Iraq with weapons despite their claims to the contrary. In the eyes of the 
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West, the PRC’s sale of HY-2 Silkworm cruise missiles to Iran represented an enormous threat to 
stability in the Gulf. The Silkworm missiles’ 60-mile range now meant that Iran had the 
capability to target oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, a 34-mile long passage through which 
much of Gulf oil passes en route to other countries. Any threat to the free flow of oil from the 
Gulf would have had disastrous consequences on the global economy.128 United States officials 
and media outlets excoriated the Chinese government for ratcheting up tensions and possibly 
jeopardizing international oil security, but the Chinese response equivocated between outright 
denial and reluctant admission that sales had occurred through third parties. In mid-1987, the 
Chinese informed the U.N. Security Council that it was finally ready to support a U.S.-backed 
resolution calling for immediate ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War. Nevertheless, U.S. fears about 
the danger posed by the Silkworms were confirmed in October 1987, when Iranian-launched 
Silkworms struck American-flagged tankers in the Gulf. In late October, the United States 
announced that it had frozen any further sales of technology to the PRC. The ban was lifted 
shortly thereafter when Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian pledged that the Chinese would no longer 
provide Iran with additional Silkworms.129  
China’s conduct during the last two years of the war reveals something important about 
its calculation of regional interests. Although China’s primary goal during the war was selling 
arms to spur its own economic growth, its position as a relatively weak power meant that it 
ultimately had to yield to the prerogatives of the United States. When the U.S. perceived China’s 
Silkworm sales as a threat to its own oil interests, it publicly censured Chinese actions. China 
responded with good faith efforts to forestall additional fighting by signing onto multilateral 
ceasefire resolutions at the U.N. And when America threatened to cut off economic assistance,                                                         
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China promptly agreed to cease selling the missiles. Although China became more economically 
independent as it continued along the path of modernization, this trend of balancing its economic 
interests against a broader interest of appeasing the United States and international community 
would come to define its conduct in the Post-Cold War Period (1990-2003). 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Chinese foreign policy toward the Middle East during the Iran-Iraq War yielded 
many benefits for China. First, the Chinese earned billions in hard currency through arms deals 
that were used to fuel continued economic growth. Second, its military support for both regimes 
– even if China was playing both ends against the middle – fostered goodwill with both 
governments. Third, the war offered a valuable opportunity to test Chinese military technology 
under real battlefield conditions.130 Coming off the heels of a dismal performance in Vietnam, 
China was able to analyze the performance of its weapons in direct contrast to U.S.-made Iranian 
weapons, and Iraq’s Soviet-made weapons.131 Fourth, the war went a long way toward 
augmenting China’s prestige and relevance to Middle Eastern regimes. 
More generally, the Transition Period was a formative juncture for determining the future 
of China’s Middle East policy. Although the Independent Foreign Policy adopted by Beijing at 
the beginning of the decade laid out a theoretical framework for Chinese bilateral relations 
during the Transition Period, in reality, the PRC’s economic and bilateral relationships 
progressed in fits and starts as the CCP struggled to crystallize China’s true interests. Initially, it 
appeared unlikely that China would compromise its Cold War definition of stability – preventing 
the further encroachment of superpower influence in the Gulf – by prolonging a war that                                                         
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weakened the region as a whole. By the mid-80s, however, Beijing had all but abandoned this 
hedging strategy in favor of economic growth. Thus, the Transition Period marked a shift in 
China’s understanding of stability away from the Cold War preoccupation with hedging against 
the superpowers and toward securing the regional conditions necessary for domestic 
modernization. The Iran-Iraq War served as a vehicle for that change. At best, then, China’s 
Middle East policy during the 80s, and certainly its policies toward Iraq and Iran, can be 
described as experimental.132  
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IV. THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD (1989-PRESENT) 
OVERVIEW: CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS 
 China’s Middle East foreign policy in the Post-Cold War Period first and foremost 
reflected an intensification of China’s drive for economic modernization. I refer to this era as the 
Post-Cold War Period not because Chinese Gulf policy somehow shifted in direct response to the 
fall of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, by the end of the Transition Period the PRC’s fears 
about the threat posed by either superpower ceased to really be a relevant consideration at all. 
Instead, China’s new foreign policy during this era arose out of a set of circumstances unique to 
the Post-Cold War era: the United States’ role as the sole superpower, the increased salience of 
the United Nations, and China’s hunger for oil to feed its economic modernization policies. This 
period is also defined by China’s need to balance its economic interests against its interest in 
cooperating with the United States and the international community. This equilibrium is the 
“stability” that China has sought after the events of Tiananmen in 1989. The following case 
studies of the two Iraq Wars illustrate how political circumstances molded Chinese Middle East 
policy from 1989-2003. 
The Impact of Tiananmen: Western and the Middle Eastern Responses Compared 
 On June 4, 1989, the Chinese government brutally shut down a mostly student-led protest 
in Tiananmen Square. The massive crackdown left somewhere from 900 to 3,000 people dead 
and seriously tarnished the CCP’s international reputation.”133 In response, many Western 
countries, with the United States in the lead, immediately sought to punish the regime by 
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imposing severe economic and trade sanctions, embargoing the transfer of arms and military 
technology, and suspending important economic transactions such as loans, and private and 
governmental investments. Diplomatic relations between the PRC and many Western 
governments were also placed on hold.134 Having quickly forfeited much of the goodwill it had 
built since the beginning of its opening to the outside world after Mao’s death, the PRC found 
itself dangerously isolated, perhaps more so than at any point in the post-Mao era. Thus, during 
the first years of the Post-Cold War Period, China’s main foreign policy concern was extricating 
itself from the public relations morass it had created for itself. Its conduct during the First Iraq 
War, discussed below, should be viewed through the lens of China’s attempts to undo the 
setbacks in economic and diplomatic relations following Tiananmen.135 
 But first, it should be stressed that this approach only applied to China’s relations with 
the West. After Tiananmen, Chinese-Middle East relations actually improved. Whereas Western 
countries responded to the incident with scorching indictments of the Chinese government, 
conservative Gulf regimes expressed understanding, even insisting that Western governments 
had no right to interfere with China’s internal affairs. This difference in opinion can be explained 
in a couple ways. First, while the West’s hostility was rooted in the abuse of human rights, the 
authoritarian regimes of Gulf countries have historically placed less emphasis on these values. 
Second, Middle Eastern governments appreciated China’s unwavering support – or at least, 
consistent neutrality on regional issues – in contrast to their perennially rocky relations with the 
West.136 This sentiment was echoed by the CCP. Conservative Chinese leaders saw the West’s 
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suddenly volatile criticisms of the Chinese government to be indicative of the West’s caprice and 
untrustworthiness.  
 The fallout of Tiananmen provided incentives for a reaffirmation of China’s relationship 
with the Middle East. Not only did the Middle East serve as a bedrock of support, but it was also 
home to some of China’s crucial interests. The Middle East was one of the largest markets for 
Chinese goods and labor services, arms, and boasted the largest supply of known oil reserves in 
the world (Iraq containing the second largest supplies in the region as a whole). Although China 
had hitherto prided itself on energy self-sufficiency, its meteoric economic development under 
Deng Xiaoping ensured that this could only be sustained for so long. Old habits die hard as well: 
China’s historical alignment with the Third World against the West probably contributed much 
to the CCP’s attempt to consolidate relations with Middle Eastern countries. That is not to say 
that the PRC preferred the support of Middle Eastern regimes to that of the West; merely that, as 
the proverbial beggar, China could not afford to be choosy. 
 To ensure that its bilateral relations with Gulf regimes would continue to flourish, the 
CCP launched a public relations counteroffensive. The Chinese government immediately 
dispatched emissaries, including Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, NPC vice-chairman Wan Li, and 
even President Yang Shangkun, to meet with Middle Eastern leaders and stress China’s intention 
to remain an important economic partner in the region.137 Given the diplomatic bombshell of 
Tiananmen, China did all it could to revive its reputation abroad. The diplomatic overtures made 
toward the Middle East express the economic importance and special cultural affinity the CCP 
ascribed to Gulf countries and explain, in part, China’s hesitance to support intervention during 
the First Iraq War. 
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THE FIRST IRAQ WAR (1990-1991) 
Background: A Win-Win Opportunity 
 The First Iraq War was a win-win situation for China: its participation in multilateral 
discussions furnished the opportunity for China to position itself as a key player in the 
international community, while simultaneously establishing China’s sympathy for vulnerable 
Gulf monarchies. In other words, China was able to shore up its relations with the United States 
and international community, while leaving its relations in the Middle East relatively unaffected 
(except with respect to Iraq). 
 When Saddam Hussein’s military invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the international 
outrage was palpable. Still reeling from the crushing debt of financing the Iran-Iraq War, 
Saddam’s regime turned a covetous eye toward Kuwait. Not only did the small nation possess a 
lucrative oil trade of its own, but it was indirectly inflicting economic damage upon its larger 
neighbor. Kuwait refused to forgive Iraq’s debt from the war, and its overproduction of oil 
flooded the market and depressed Iraq’s own petroleum revenues. Once again, Saddam also 
relied on the reasoning that Kuwait comprised an historical part of the Iraqi homeland, styling 
the invasion a “revolution in Kuwait.” Beijing joined the rest of the world in expressing its deep 
concern, and as in the case of the Iran-Iraq War, made “appeals for an immediate end to military 
action and for the settlement of the dispute through peaceful negotiations.”138 But unlike the case 
of China’s stance during the Iran-Iraq War, there was little to suggest duplicitous motives. Given 
the outrage over China’s actions following Tiananmen, Beijing was at pains to stress its 
eagerness to comply with international norms, and the international community’s absolute 
rejection of Saddam’s actions ensured that China would publicly rebuke Baghdad as well.                                                         
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Premier Li Peng reaffirmed in no uncertain terms that “China always opposes the invasion of any 
country by another force. ‘We are against such things, whether they occur in America, Asia, or 
the Middle East.’” And due to the heightened scrutiny over China’s sales to Iraq and Iran during 
the 1980s, Li also made a point to assure the world that “China naturally will not sell weapons to 
Iraq.”139  
China’s Motivations 
 First and foremost, China’s cooperation on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
regarding the First Iraq War was an attempt to rehabilitate its global image and in particular to 
improve its relationship with the United States. Against the backdrop of the 1987 Silkworm 
missile sales and the 1989 Tiananmen tragedy, Sino-American relations remained frosty. The 
sanctions regime imposed against the PRC by the United States was biting, and Chinese leaders 
understood that the overarching goal of economic growth could not be achieved without 
placating Washington and removing the sanctions. Saddam’s flagrant violation of international 
law, then, was a godsend. Not only did Saddam displace the Chinese government in world media 
as the most odious global boogeyman, he provided the Chinese government a perfect opportunity 
to resurrect its status in the international community. Any multilateral action taken against the 
Iraqi government necessitated China’s support: the West was forced to reopen its dialogue with 
the Chinese. Thus, U.S. lobbying for Chinese support began the very same day that Iraqi forces 
invaded Kuwait and stretched over the following weeks.  
 Hwei-ling Huo argues that China’s motivations in the First Iraq War should not be 
reduced to an attempt to clean up the public relations imbroglio left by the Tiananmen incident. 
Instead, Huo contends that China’s cooperation with the international community was evidence                                                         
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of its acceptance of the New World Order. Far from embracing the idealism that the phrase 
suggests, Huo asserts that China’s calculations were rooted in a realistic assessment of its 
domestic and foreign policy choices in the post-Cold War world. By 1989, Deng’s economic 
policies had resulted in fundamental reforms in the political and social realms as well; to switch 
course midstream would yield disastrous results. As both the Tiananmen episode and the cascade 
of recent revolutions in the Soviet Union had shown, reform of nondemocratic systems was an 
irreversible trend in the world. Both China’s domestic population and its international friends 
would inevitably expect change. Chinese leaders, according to Huo, concluded that reform 
would have to continue, and that the best way to achieve controlled progress was through 
economic development and continued opening up to the outside world. In other words, China 
viewed the process of democratizing government and continued economic growth as inextricably 
linked. But for either of these long-term development plans to reach fruition, China needed to 
ensure an external environment amenable to its reforms.140 In this way, Chinese participation in 
the New World Order reflected a broader, long-term consideration of its future economic and 
political interests. 
 Whether or not this particular argument is compelling, it is clear that China sought to 
establish its importance to the international community. As Peking University Professor Wu 
Bingbing notes, the Gulf crisis was a platform for China to change its relationship with other 
world powers.141 For example, in November 1990, Foreign Minister Qian held a working 
meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Xinjiang to discuss the situation 
on the Gulf. This was unusual, as high-level bilateral discussions of Middle Eastern issues were a 
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rarity in Sino-Soviet relations.142 More generally, however, the Gulf crisis proved that it was 
impossible to achieve a settlement on major international problems without the participation of 
the PRC. Thus, a host of different reasons incentivized the Chinese to take part in the multilateral 
diplomacy against Saddam Hussein. And although the main goal of improving China’s political 
relations with the outside world was at the forefront, participation also served a second goal of 
ending U.S. sanctions and continuing economic growth. 
China and the United Nations 
 In total, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed twelve important Security 
Council resolutions (SCRs) against Iraq during 1990. While China voted in favor of the first 
eleven enforcement resolutions, it abstained on SCR 678, authorizing the use of multilateral 
military force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwaiti territory. The explanation for why China 
objected to this resolution in particular, and why it chose to abstain rather than exercise its veto 
power, illustrates China’s attempt to avoid alienating either its Arab or Western friends.  
Initially, China was eager to participate in the collective decision-making over Iraq, 
emphasizing the principles of peace and compliance with international norms. Li Daoyu, the 
PRC Ambassador to the UN at the time, indicated that Deng Xiaoping himself set the principles 
and guidelines for China’s UN decisions. Deng stressed that first, Iraq must comply with all the 
UN Security Council Resolutions, and second, that China would not endorse any proposal to use 
armed force to settle the Iraq-Kuwait dispute.143 The first point highlighted China’s commitment 
to respecting and upholding international law, while the second conformed to China’s time-
honored Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 
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Without exception, China’s voting record on the first eleven SCRs adhered to these 
principles. China made a point to speak out against or revise SCR provisions that did not fit 
within its framework of peaceful resolution. Since China viewed Iraq’s incursion into Kuwait as 
a violation of national and territorial sovereignty, it did not hesitate to vote in favor of SCR 660 
condemning the Iraqi invasion and demanding its withdrawal on August 2, 1990. Four days later, 
China voted in favor of SCR 661 imposing economic sanctions on Iraq. Although China 
possessed significant commercial interests in Iraq, these were outweighed by the benefit of 
attaining the international community’s goodwill. Still, Li Daoyu made sure to warn his 
colleagues on the UNSC against being too hasty in punishing Iraq. After voting in favor of SCR 
662 declaring the annexation of Kuwait to be null and void, he again stressed the importance of a 
peaceful conclusion to the conflict. Overall, the Chinese leadership was sanguine about the 
prospects for success under the framework of the United Nations – so long as all actions were 
undertaken with the strictest understanding that force would not be involved. On August 22, 
1990, Ambassador Li stated: 
“We believe that in order to solve the serious crisis in the Gulf, at present, it is 
necessary to seriously and effectively implement these resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council…At the same time, China has always in principle opposed 
military involvement by big powers…Under the present circumstances, taking 
military action will lead to further aggravation of the situation and escalation of 
the armed conflict, which cannot help solve the problem. We are concerned about 
this.”144 
 
But beginning with SCR 664, China started to express reservations about the increasingly 
forceful language of the draft resolutions being considered in the Security Council. SCR 664 
demanded that Iraq permit and facilitate the departure of nationals from third-party countries 
within Iraq and Kuwait. The resolution drew its authority from Chapter VII of the United                                                         
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Nations Charter, which authorizes military and nonmilitary action to restore international peace 
and security. Eventually, China voted for the resolution but felt it was inappropriate to cite 
Chapter VII, seeing that the treatment of foreign nationals was separate from the broader issue of 
invasion. China also insisted on amending SCR 665, which authorized maritime forces in the 
Gulf to uphold the economic sanctions “with a minimum use of force.” China objected to this 
language, instead proposing that the UNSC only authorize “any such measures commensurate to 
the specific circumstances as may be necessary,” as this did not necessarily imply military force. 
The draft resolution was passed with China’s amendment on August 25.145  
By November, however, the major states had grown resentful of Saddam’s disregard for 
the UN’s collection action and tired of waiting for the sanctions to take effect. A coalition of 
member states including the U.S., UK, France, several Arab states, and other member states 
deployed forces to Saudi Arabia, laying the groundwork for a full-scale military invasion. In 
October 1990, the United States drafted SCR 678, offering Iraq one last chance to comply with 
SCR 660, which demanded Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. If Saddam refused, member states 
were authorized “to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and 
all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.” 
Here, China felt the need to dissociate two issues: the issue of Iraq’s direct aggression against 
Kuwait, and the issue of external military intervention.146 
China faced three potential options. First, China could identify with the Iraqi side in the 
conflict and exercise its veto power. This, however, would have infuriated the Western powers, 
and principally the United States, which had worked extremely diligently to produce this 
unprecedented global cooperation on an issue that nearly every nation agreed upon. In addition,                                                         
145 For a more in-depth discussion of China’s voting record on the eleven enforcement resolutions against 
Iraq during 1990, see Yang, China in UN Security Council Decision-Making on Iraq, 83-86. 
146 Shichor, “Decisionmaking in Triplicate,” 204. 
 From Beijing to Baghdad | 68 
it would have alienated a swath of Arab countries that feared Iraq’s growing aggressiveness. 
Second, China could vote in favor of the U.S.-backed resolution; but this would directly 
contradict China’s clearly articulated principle about the non-use of force. In addition, Beijing 
felt uncomfortable linking itself with the ambitions of former colonialist powers. China feared 
that jumping into bed with such historically strange bedfellows would sully its reputation, 
especially in the Middle East, as the lone Third World permanent representative on the UNSC.147 
So, China followed a third path and abstained on the vote. The final tally was twelve in favor, 
two against (Cuba and Yemen), and one abstention (China).  
Evaluation: China and the First Iraq War 
 Some scholars, such as Lillian Craig Harris, argue that the Gulf crisis was seriously 
detrimental to China’s long-term interests. To start, China suffered immediate economic losses 
of $2-3 billion. This resulted in part from losing the earnings and assets of 60 Chinese companies 
in Iraq and Kuwait, and a $300 million Kuwaiti development loan, only half of which had been 
delivered. In addition, Iraq owed China a significant amount of debt on which payment was 
frozen, and the war forced the halt of several major development projects in both countries.148 
China was also forced to undertake the evacuation of some 10,000 workers from both countries 
through Jordan. 149  
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 Harris also suggests that China suffered major diplomatic losses as a result of the war, 
particularly with respect to Middle Eastern regimes. Despite China’s abstention on SCR 678, 
Harris notes that Arab regimes were not completely fooled by China’s careful politicking. On the 
one hand, China was now at risk of appearing to be yet another bully exercising control over 
Middle Eastern countries through economic and technical aid. China’s participation in the UN 
during the First Iraq War may have fostered its reputation as being in a de facto alliance with the 
West. On the other hand, China’s unwillingness to support the use of force against Iraq (a 
country feared by many other regimes in the Gulf) drew the displeasure of other Gulf regimes 
such as Egypt and Kuwait. Since in their view China could not be counted upon to assist its Arab 
friends, China was shut out of consultations on the post-crisis Gulf security arrangements and all 
but excluded from involvement in forthcoming Kuwait reconstruction projects.150 
 It is unclear, however, that these short-term economic and diplomatic losses outweighed 
the long-term gains China reaped as a result of the First Iraq War. True, China suffered a 
significant financial setback in the immediate aftermath of the invasion to the invasion. But its 
willingness to participate in Western-led collective action went a long way toward rehabilitating 
its public image and restoring the conditions for economic progress that existed before the 
Tiananmen disaster. Even before voting on SCR 678, Western Europe was so pleased with 
China’s participation on the first eleven enforcement resolutions that it lifted the economic 
sanctions against China. Meanwhile, by the end of December, Japan resumed loans and financial 
assistance that had been held up after the Tiananmen incident. And despite tough Congressional 
opposition, Washington ultimately approved China’s Most-Favored-Nation trading status.151 
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 Nor is it clear that the Gulf War took as great a toll on China’s diplomatic relations as 
Harris asserts. To the extent that China’s relationship with Iraq and other Gulf regimes were hurt 
as a result of the war, a couple of qualifications are in order. First, China maintained open 
dialogue with Middle Eastern regimes during the entirety of the crisis. The PRC did all within its 
power to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis in the lead up to SCR 678, and it 
was one of few countries to dispatch an emissary to the Middle East after Iraq’s invasion in 
August. From November 6-12, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen travelled to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, and Iraq – the purpose of Qian’s visit was “to explore with leaders of those countries the 
possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis.”152 In this capacity, the Chinese were able 
to actively engage with the region. In serving as an intermediary between Iraq and the West, the 
Chinese promoted dialogue and acted as a messenger.153 Second, any economic backlash that 
China suffered was short-term in nature. As the next section will show, China’s bilateral 
relationships with Gulf countries expanded after 1992, when China’s need for oil from the region 
began to benefit from its policy of steadfast neutrality. 
 Perhaps more importantly, China was able to accomplish its principal goal of restoring its 
relationship with the United States. During Qian’s November trip to the Middle East, for 
example, he had the opportunity to meet with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in Cairo to 
discuss the possibility of China’s support for military action.154 Qian claimed that the meeting 
was “conducive to improving relations between China and the United States.”155 And in 
exchange for not wielding its veto on UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 678, Beijing 
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requested and was granted a meeting between Qian and President Bush in December. This was 
the first time that a senior Chinese official had been invited to the White House since the ban on 
contact imposed shortly after the Tiananmen incident.156 The First Iraq War had required 
important bilateral dialogue and suggested that Sino-U.S. cooperation was integral to the New 
World Order.  
CHINESE ENERGY SECURITY 
China’s Growing Energy Needs  
 During most of the latter half of the twentieth century, China relied on domestic 
production to satisfy its energy needs. In fact, it had been a net exporter of oil since the Sino-
Soviet split in 1960. The initial period of Sino-Soviet comity preceding the split provided many 
benefits to China. Among these were Soviet technological advisors and large-scale cooperation 
in the energy sector. Indeed, China was dependent on the Soviet Union for more than 50% of its 
critical refined oil products during the 1950s.157 But when Sino-Soviet relations ground to a halt 
in 1960, the Kremlin withdrew its advisors from China’s oil sector. Although the PRC continued 
to import products from the Soviet Union following the split, it prioritized self-sufficiency in oil 
as a goal to ensure energy security thereafter. 
 After 1978, China expanded production of low technology, labor-intensive consumer 
goods that had been more or less ignored under the state-planned economy. The fastest growing 
sectors during the 1980s and 1990s were labor-intensive light manufacturing powered by 
township and village enterprises. Overall the introduction of competition between state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and the nascent private sector inevitably made energy cost management a 
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relevant factor in the production of goods.158 As the Chinese economy rapidly expanded toward 
the close of the century, energy demand skyrocketed, as did the energy intensity of economic 
output.159 This phenomenon can be attributed to the growth of China’s energy-intensive heavy 
industry sector following Deng Xiaoping’s Opening Up policy. The PRC’s financial system has 
tended to favor the heavy industrialization sector because operating costs are low, excess 
capacity can be exported without inducing normal exchange rate effects, and risk is low since 
borrowers are mostly state-owned firms. In addition, China has preferred to self-produce, rather 
than import, energy-intensive basic products such as steel and aluminum used to construct roads 
and buildings requisite for its infrastructural development.160 These factors contributed to the 
explosive rise in energy intensity during the 1990s.161 
 The year 1993 marked a turning point in Chinese energy policy as China once again 
returned to being a net importer of crude oil. During 1996, the shortfall between Chinese oil 
consumption and production was approximately 400,000 barrels per day. The gap between 
China’s domestic oil production and its consumption continued to grow and is predicted to widen 
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Source: Erica Strecker Downs, China's Quest for Energy Security, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2000). 
 
From 1992 to 1997, China’s oil material and equipment exports to the Middle East grew 710 
times.163 As the Middle East contains the largest proven oil reserves on the planet, the region’s 
increasing importance to Chinese strategic interests is obvious.  
 In addressing its growing oil needs, China has focused more on supply-side security than 
on moderating demand. In other words, the PRC has emphasized ensuring the free flow of oil to 
support its burgeoning economy, rather than voluntarily slowing down the well-performing 
heavy industry sector. Still, Beijing has realized the perils of tethering the country’s oil supply to 
the international market. Sudden increases in international oil prices can often have disastrous 
effects on a country’s domestic economy. For example, changes in oil prices – and in particular 
quick spikes – can cause domestic inflation, rising interest rates, slackened economic demand,                                                         
163 Steve A. Yetiv, and Chunlong Lu, "China, Global Energy, and the Middle East," Middle East Journal, 
61, no. 2 (2007): 203. 
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and high unemployment.164 Oil shocks have the potential to dramatically set back the PRC’s 
economic development, since as a developing nation, China is especially vulnerable to price 
fluctuations. Additionally, Beijing’s distrust of regular energy markets derives in part from the 
perception that these markets are dominated by the United States. China lacks the naval 
capabilities to competently secure the global sea-lines of communication through which most 
crude oil travels. As such, it must “free ride” on American protection of oil supply lines. And 
even though the United States is the most important guarantor of free oil flow, it is also a 
potential adversary for China.165 This puts China in the awkward position of depending on its 
strategic competitor for energy security. Beijing’s unease is compounded by the fear that the 
United States will exploit China’s need for energy as a weakness in the event of a future Sino-
American conflict.166  
 The belief among CCP leadership that energy security can best be achieved through 
control of supplies rather than through participation in a secure international market has given 
rise to China’s “equity oil strategy.” This strategy essentially entails buying oil and oil 
infrastructure across the world with the intention of diverting those resources from the world 
market for domestic consumption.167 Functionally, this requires owning both the oilfields 
themselves, as well as the transport networks that facilitate the resource’s return to China. 
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China’s National Owned Companies (NOCs) have played a crucial role in this equity oil 
strategy. NOCs such as the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the Chinese National 
Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) 
produce, import, trade, and process oil. They are also the entities that enter into exploration and 
production contracts in other nations on behalf of Beijing. By acquiring equity stakes in oil 
contracts, particularly in the Persian Gulf, the NOCs allow the Chinese government to have 
direct control over oil supply from the Middle East. 
 The purchase of equity interests in Middle Eastern oilfields yields several advantages 
over buying oil off the international market.168 First, buying equity barrels can eliminate market 
price risk by enabling the investor to predict precisely how much oil it will receive and at what 
cost over the life of the oilfield. Second, equity oil in the long-term can provide the buyer with a 
much lower price than the market price. As an equity owner, the buyer is able to produce and 
transport oil well below the market-clearing price. Third, equity ownership eliminates the need 
for middlemen such as other companies. This ultimately saves money and precludes the risk of 
the middleman cutting off supply. Theoretically, then, China’s direct access to oil under the 
equity strategy offers both stable oil flow and prices, even in the case of oil supply or price 
shocks affecting the rest of the international market.169  
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Chinese Oil Security and Iraq 
 After the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the United States maintained and 
enforced sanctions against Iraq. The most severe of these prohibited Iraqi oil exports. Chinese 
officials continuously called upon Iraq to comply fully with any UN resolutions, but they also 
expressed strong reservations about the efficacy of the ongoing sanctions regime. Many 
international commentators in 1995 declaimed the declining humanitarian condition of Iraq, 
attributing widespread hunger and unemployment to a U.S.-led sanctions regimen that was doing 
more harm to the average Iraqi citizen than to Saddam’s government. China applauded President 
Bill Clinton’s introduction of the UN Oil-for-Food Program (OFF), which permitted Iraq to sell 
limited amounts of oil in exchange for food, medicine, and other basic necessities (billions in 
revenue was corruptly siphoned away from state coffers). Although Sino-Iraqi trade was minimal 
following the First Iraq War, it rose dramatically by the end of the 1990s due to this program. 
After OFF commenced in December 1996, China actively pursued oil and construction contracts 
with Iraq. In 1996, China’s total exports to and imports from Iraq were valued at only $1.15 
million. By 1997, China’s total volume of trade with Iraq increased by $92 million dollars, and 
peaked at $517 million in 2002 (See App. 3).170 Not satisfied with limited importation of these 
resources, Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations Qin Huasen emphatically expressed in 
May 1996 China’s hope that the UN Security Council would go a step further and, 
evaluate Iraq’s efforts to implement related resolutions of the UN Security Council in an 
objective and fair manner, gradually eliminate sanctions in accordance with the progress 
of Iraq’s implementation of the UN resolutions, and, first of all, remove the sanction of 
oil export by Iraq.171  
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 One way to view Beijing’s encouragement of lifting the UN sanctions is through a 
humanitarian lens. As Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai stated, China may have been 
legitimately concerned with “easing the suffering of the Iraqi people from sanctions.”172 Another 
way is to contextualize Beijing’s actions with respect to its broader goal of achieving regional 
stability for China’s own economic growth. China’s interest in Iraq was a fairly straightforward 
matter, given China’s budding need for oil and Iraq’s title to the second largest crude oil reserves 
in the Middle East. China hoped that agitating for the free flow of Iraqi oil would generate 
another petroleum market to fuel China’s economic growth.  
 In June 1997, a consortium of Chinese oil companies represented by CNPC and China 
North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), a major arms sales agent of the Chinese government, 
signed a 22-year production-sharing contract with Iraq.173 Beijing was anxious to include 
Baghdad in its equity oil enterprise, even though most of the First Iraq War sanctions would 
remain in force until 2003. Under the agreement, China was to help develop Iraq’s Al-Ahdab oil 
field once sanctions were lifted. Al-Ahdab is Iraq’s second largest oilfield, boasting estimated 
recoverable reserves of 1.4 billion barrels. CNPC and NORINCO formed a new company, al-
Waha, to develop the field; combined, the consortium owned 50% equity in the project.174 
Simultaneously, Beijing held negotiations aimed at signing concessions on at least three other 
oilfields. Together, China’s 50% share in their combined output could supply China with 
approximately half its annual oil imports in that year alone.175 Liberating Iraqi oil was a step 
toward producing the regional stability requisite for Chinese economic growth, as evidenced by 
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MFA spokesman Cui’s wish that “the problems left by the Gulf Crisis [be] resolved as quickly as 
possible, and that peace and stability in the Gulf area can be realized at an early date.”176 
Unfortunately for Beijing, progress on the 1997 Al-Ahdab oil project would be stymied by 
America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq in the Second Iraq War. As the next section will show, China 
subjugated its interest in oil and by extension economic stability to its interest in placating the 
United States.  
THE SECOND IRAQ WAR (2003-2012) 
Background: Caught Between Iraq and a Hard Place 
 The ceasefire forged after the 1990 Gulf War was brittle at best. It was not a treaty, but a 
multilateral settlement artificially created by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. 
Saddam Hussein’s persistent truculence in the face of the UN peacekeeping sanctions passed 
after the 1990 Gulf War was a sobering reminder of the New World Order’s ineffectiveness.  
The issue of Iraqi weapons and UN weapons inspections continued to stymie progress 
and contributed significantly to the advent of the Second Iraq War. Saddam already had a history 
of employing chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). His military inflicted mass 
casualties against its enemies through these means during the Iran-Iraq War, in one famous 
instance called the “Anfal,” or spoils of war, campaign killing somewhere from 50,000 to 
100,000 Iranians.177 In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed SCR 687, 
ordering Iraq to destroy its chemical and biological weapons and reaffirming SCR 661’s 
imposition of economic sanctions. The resolution also created the United Nations Special 
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to monitor Iraqi disarmament. During the course of                                                         
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investigation, UNSCOM unearthed astonishing evidence of Iraq’s significant investments in 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Saddam caused a global crisis in August 1998 when 
he shut down UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) weapons inspections. In 
response, the United States Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, calling for containment and 
regime change in Iraq. Tensions ratcheted up in 1999 when the Iraqi military fired anti-aircraft 
artillery and missiles at U.S. and British planes in the no-fly zones operated in northern and 
southern Iraq. Altogether, the collapse of the weapons inspections regime, Saddam’s undoing of 
the carefully wrought economic sanctions, and his military challenge to the no-fly zones 
undermined American containment policy and convinced Washington that Saddam was a threat 
to U.S. national security.178  
Meanwhile, the PRC continued to insist on the principle of the non-use of force in 
resolving the worsening U.S.-Iraqi dispute. Qin Huasen stated that the United States’ unilateral 
military strikes in the no-fly zone represented “a worrying trend” about the “willful use of force, 
especially unilateral actions taken without the Council’s authorization.”179 Then came the 9/11 
terrorist attack against the United States in 2001, which left America vulnerable and profoundly 
altered Washington’s conception of national security. Against the backdrop of the 9/11 attacks, 
Saddam’s refusal to disavow possession of nuclear weapons along with mistaken intelligence 
pointing to Iraq’s harboring of Al Qaeda operatives looked damning. The United States was 
poised for war. With obligations to both ensuring its economic interests and supporting the 
United States during this time of need, Beijing was caught between conflicting foreign policy 
interests. 
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Beijing’s Balancing Act 
 The Second Iraq War proved to be a fundamentally different creature from the Iran-Iraq 
and First Iraq Wars for China. Several factors militated against any Chinese endorsement of 
President Bush’s Second Iraq War. To begin with, China’s economic involvement in the Persian 
Gulf was never more indispensible to its modernization campaign. Arms sales, labor export, and 
construction had all declined and were replaced by the all-consuming importance of oil.180 The 
prospect of an American invasion threatened China’s over $7 billion obligations in Iraq, and in 
particular oil contracts valued at over $1 billion; the resulting rise in oil prices could have deep 
economic ramifications in the mainland.181 In addition, Beijing now occupied a fresh position in 
the international community. The ghost of Tiananmen had faded, and China was now an 
emerging – and even respected – economic, military, and political power. As the First Iraq War 
showed, Beijing had painstakingly sought to assure the world community that it was a 
responsible stakeholder, just as it tried to establish its integrity in the Middle East through a 
reputation of non-interference.  
 Nevertheless, Beijing’s hand was practically forced due to its ever-present Post-Cold War 
interest in currying favor, or at least avoiding the ire, of the United States. The circumstances 
that generated the Second Iraq War provided a rationale for Chinese support from a security 
standpoint, too, as the United States’ initial premise for invasion was the threat of Iraqi WMDs. 
China may have found this rationale more palatable than the human rights issues raised when the 
United States intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo during the 90s.182 More importantly, Beijing was 
at pains to repair the Sino-U.S. relationship in light of the strained tone it had assumed at the turn                                                         
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of the millennium. The collision of an American reconnaissance plane and a Chinese fighter jet 
caused a diplomatic crisis in 2001. Then, when President Bush enumerated “rogue states” in his 
early national security speeches, many analysts inferred that the administration was implicitly 
suggesting China was the backer of these regimes. Additionally, a classified U.S. Nuclear 
Posture Review leaked to the press in 2002 identified China as one of seven possible targets of 
nuclear attack by the United States. The Bush Administration’s aggressive new posture of 
preemptive warfare under the Bush Doctrine further elicited Beijing’s fears.183 In this context, 
China could ill-afford to earn the wrath of a vulnerable and war-hungry Washington.  
 Yitzhak Shichor believes that Beijing may even have quietly welcomed the U.S.-led 
military intervention because it believed (mistakenly) that the crisis would the quickest and least 
disruptive way to solve the problem of Saddam Hussein’s intransigence. China was now 
considerably dependent on Gulf oil and especially eager to see regional and economic stability to 
further its economic growth. Saddam’s temperamental control over Iraq’s oil exportations 
coupled with the alarm he aroused in other littoral states in the Gulf were far from ideal. 184 
Given the United States’ stunning display of military superiority in the First Iraq War, It was 
reasonable to think that Second War could restore order relatively quickly and painlessly. 
Although the Chinese preferred peaceful multilateral action, if the United States was determined 
to invade, then swift action was preferable from an economic perspective.185 
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 American military forces invaded Iraq in 2003. This time, Washington sidestepped the 
United Nations Security Council in order to minimize the ability other nations’ ability to water 
down the war effort. Chinese actions in the wake of the invasion bear out the notion that its 
policy was a careful balancing act between salvaging its own interests and avoiding antagonizing 
the United States. Seeing the conflict was unavoidable, China frantically prepared for the 
economic consequences to come. In the month prior to the outbreak of war, China increased its 
oil imports, principally from Africa and Russia, by over 2/3 in comparison to the previous 
year.186 China also created a National Energy Commission to design a national energy and oil 
security plan, to adjust the structures of national energy production and consumption, and to map 
out a plan to reduce reliance on foreign crude oil and natural gas.187  
 Beijing sought to avoid confrontation with Washington by taking a very measured tone in 
publicly addressing the American action in the Gulf. It did not add its voice to the French-
Russian-German joint statement issued on February 24, 2003 balking at the American invasion. 
Instead, Beijing harnessed this opportunity to stress the importance of multilateral dialogue on 
the issue. This was in line with the Chinese government’s general trend toward encouraging 
greater UN involvement in Iraq throughout the 90s, including both the First Iraq War and the 
WMD fiasco. Despite China’s historical reluctance to participate in the UN, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Tang Jiaxuan was remarkably busy in early 2003, making four trips to the UN to lobby 
for a political resolution to the Iraq conflict. China even voted in favor of SCR 1546, legitimizing 
the presence of U.S.-led multinational peacekeeping forces in Iraq. Last, official Chinese 
opprobrium of U.S. actions in Iraq was moderate. Most criticism was restricted to skepticism 
regarding America’s attempt to democratize the Middle East. While some newspapers opined                                                         
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that U.S. military action was a violation of international law and the UN charter, many also 
characterized the U.S. role in Iraq as one of safeguarding the new Iraqi government and helping 
train army officers and policemen.188 
Evaluation: China and the Second Iraq War 
 As was the case with the First Iraq War, China suffered some immediate economic harm 
in the aftermath of the Second Iraq War. In the first four months of 2003 – the year of the 
American invasion – Chinese oil imports grew by 42.9%, but its payments rose by 110.6% per 
year, resulting in extra costs of about $4 billion. The war also disrupted the progress of more 
than 100 projects with Chinese participation underway in the MENA region, while affecting tens 
of thousands of contract workers. Additionally, the three Iraqi oil concession projects mentioned 
above were put on hold.189  
 Still, China was able to achieve substantial long-term gains from the Second Iraq War. 
Beijing was prudent in restraining its criticism of the U.S.-led war effort. As a result, the PRC 
was not placed on the U.S. list of countries (which included Russia, France, and Germany) 
excluded from bidding on reconstruction projects in Iraq.190 Beijing pledged $25 million to the 
reconstruction effort and agreed to forgive a large part of Iraq’s multi-billion dollar outstanding 
debt in an attempt to improve its goodwill and to earn tangible benefits from the new 
government. In fact, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Shen Guofang stated explicitly that China 
forgave the debt owned by Saddam’s regime for the purpose of gaining access to the bidding 
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processes on big oil and infrastructure projects.191 These overtures were well received. In 
November 2008, CNPC signed a Developing Service Contract with Iraq’s Ministry of Oil and 
resumed development on the Al-Ahdab Oilfield, the concession originally agreed upon in 1997. 
In 2009, CNPC joined with BP to win the operating rights to the Rumaila Oilfield. Rumaila 
boasts oil reserves of about 17 billion barrels, and is Iraq’s largest oilfield and the sixth largest 
oilfield in the world. That same year also witnessed CPNC’s joint venture with Total and 
Petronas in winning the contract for Halfaya Oilfield in southern Iraq.192 By 2013, China was 
jointly operating three fields in the south of Iraq, in total producing 1.4 million barrels per day – 
more than half Iraq’s output.193  
 The Second Iraq War also offered China less tangible benefits. The United States’ 
miscalculation and prolonged presence in the Middle Eastern country seemingly confirmed the 
prudence of Beijing’s non-interference doctrine. The Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo 
took America’s abject failure in Iraq as a lesson against involving China in the internal politics of 
other countries. The Second Iraq War was also beneficial to China insofar as China has a 
strategic interest in the decline of U.S. power. The United States’ distraction in Iraq limited the 
opportunity for it to implement an anti-China containment policy.194 More broadly, the War 
distracted American attention and resources, drove the U.S. into further financial distress, eroded 
American credibility with allies, and stained America’s international image. Militarily, the Iraq 
War gave Beijing the opportunity to witness an even more extensive display of American 
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military technology and provided it with insight into the nature of highly information-intensive 
modern warfare.195 
CONCLUSION 
 China’s political and economic circumstances changed rapidly during the 90s and into the 
2000s. Despite this dazzling transformation, United States has remained an omnipresent 
consideration in Middle East foreign policymaking. The First and Second Iraq Wars amply 
demonstrate Beijing’s resolve to move forward with its modernization policies, but not at the 
cost of antagonizing Washington. Thus, China’s conception of stability in the Post-Cold War 
Period has been centered on the pursuit of two main interests: economic growth in the form of oil 
and maintaining healthy relations with the United States.  
 
  
                                                        
195 Kurt M. Campbell, Nirav Patel, Richard Weitz, “The Ripple Effect: China’s Responses to the Iraq 
War,” Working paper, Center for a New American Strategy, (2008). 
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V. FINAL CONCLUSION 
 In half a century, the foundation of Chinese Iraq policy migrated from Bandung to barrels 
of oil. Along the way, China’s ideological and practical interests changed rapidly. The Sino-Iraqi 
relationship reflected these changes – from direct partnership, to outright antagonism, to 
calculated but friendly neutrality. But that does not mean Chinese policy in Iraq was erratic or 
haphazard. Far from it, the PRC’s approach to the Republic of Iraq exhibits an internally 
consistent logic, merely adjusting in response to China’s evolving domestic needs and 
international ambitions.  
 Central to this logic is the PRC’s status as a relatively “weak” power. Compared to 
countries like the United States, the PRC has historically lacked the political and economic clout 
to mold conditions in the Middle East to suit its needs. In the absence of this power, China’s 
Middle East policy has thus been aimed at ensuring regional stability in manner consistent with 
China’s interests. The precise definition of regional stability has varied almost decade by decade, 
and this paper has identified a paradigm for analyzing these evolving foreign policy trends over 
three different periods. During each period, China’s ideological, economic, and strategic 
considerations resulted in a specific understanding of “stability.” 
 During the Cold War Period (1958-1979), China’s primary foes were the United States 
and later the Soviet Union. Beijing’s understanding of regional stability entailed preventing the 
further geographic encroachment of either superpower into the Middle East. Iraq served as a 
“Cold War” battleground that the Chinese attempted to wean from superpower control. Beijing 
initially hailed the founding of the Republic of Iraq in 1958 and commenced trade and extended 
economic assistance to enhance its political relationship with the country. During the 1960s, 
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however, the bilateral relationship soured as a series of new Iraqi regimes sought closer ties to 
the superpowers. The latter half of the 1970s saw a renewed energy in Sino-Iraqi relations, and 
China inaugurated a host of construction and labor projects that promoted goodwill between both 
nations. Chinese economic aid and cooperation with Iraq during this time served the purpose of 
enhancing the political relationship, with the ultimate goal of hedging against the superpowers. 
 The Transition Period (1980-1988) challenged the previous definition of stability by 
pitting China’s interest in combating the superpowers against its interests in economic growth. 
China publicly discouraged both belligerents of the Iran-Iraq War from fighting, alleging that 
their confrontation opened the door to superpower intervention. On the other hand, China 
concluded approximately $9.4 billion in arms transfer agreements with both countries from 
1981-1988, playing a crucial role in prolonging the war. These actions highlight Beijing’s 
gradual prioritization of its economic interests over its fear of superpower hegemony. This 
“transition” in priorities is the namesake of The Transition Period. 
 Finally, the Post-Cold War Period (1989-present) exhibits China’s almost exclusively 
utilitarian definition of stability: the free flow of oil to fuel domestic economic growth. And 
despite China’s remarkable economic progress since the 1980s, the two Iraq Wars during this 
last Period also demonstrate China’s need to maintain good relations with the United States and 
the international community. China’s neutrality with respect to the American invasions in Iraq 
during 1990 and 2003 reveals real and continuing limitations on China’s ability to shape events 
in the region.  
 The future direction of Chinese Iraq policy – and China’s broader Middle East policy – is 
uncertain. If this project’s findings are any indication, then it is clear that China’s interests in the 
Middle East are constantly in flux. Thus, China’s current Post-Cold War approach is unlikely to 
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remain as is. On the one hand, it is possible that the world’s increasingly scarce resources 
coupled with China’s explosive economic and population growth will generate future 
competition with other nations, and in particular with the United States. If that is the case, then  
China’s good relations with Middle Eastern nations, rooted in their shared Third World heritage, 
may give it the upper hand as a competitor for Gulf oil. But there is also reason for optimism. 
China’s consistent emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in conducting affairs 
with the Middle East is a matter of record. More importantly, the two Iraq Wars, and even 
China’s respective abstention in the UN votes on Libya in 2011 and its veto against UN 
resolutions to intervene in Syria, indicate a preference for communicating and working through 
multilateral institutions to deal with Middle East crises. By word and by deed, the Chinese have 
expressed their determination to participate in the international community as responsible 
stakeholders. 
 Ultimately, the People’s Republic of China will continue to emphasize regional stability, 
although the definitional nuances of that word may change. As China continues to develop, we 
can expect that it will more forcefully assert the principle of nonintervention in the event of 
future Middle East crises. And with respect to the prospects for Sino-Iraqi relations, the future is 
indeed bright. Both Iraq’s economic and political situation and relationship to China are likely to 
improve as it recovers from the legacy of American occupation and develops its oil infrastructure 
and human capital. What we can expect, then, will be the abundant flow of goods and services, 
collaboration and cooperation, from Beijing to Baghdad, and back.  
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VI. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 – Key Abbreviations 
 
 
CCP   Chinese Communist Party 
CIA   Central Intelligence Agency 
CNOOC  China National Offshore Oil Company 
CNPC   Chinese National Petroleum Corporation 
ICP   Iraqi Communist Party 
IMF   International Monetary Fund 
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency 
KMT   Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) 
MENA  Middle East North Africa 
MFA   Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
NCNA   New China News Agency 
NOC   National Owned Companies 
NORINCO  China North Industries Corporation 
NPC   National People’s Congress 
OFF   UN Oil-for-Food Program 
PLA   People’s Liberation Army 
PRC   People’s Republic of China 
SCR   Security Council Resolution 
SIPRI   Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
UAR   United Arab Republic 
UN   United Nations 
UNSC   United Nations Security Council 
US   United States 
USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WMD   Weapons of mass destruction 
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No. delivered could be between 250 and 
1300 
 (650) YW-531/Type-63 APC (1981) 1982-1988 (650) Incl some YW-701 CP version 
 40 F-6/Farmer Fighter aircraft (1982) 1982-1983 (40) Delivered via Egypt and Jordan 
 (1500) WZ-121/Type-69 Tank (1982) 1983-1987 (1500) Type-69-I and Type-69-II version 
 (90) F-7A Fighter aircraft 1983 1983-1987 (90) F-7B version; assembled in Egypt and 
transferred via 
       Jordan; no. could be up to 100 
(100) Type-63 107mm Towed MRL (1983) 1984-1988 (100) Probably assembled or produced in Iraq 
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Appendix 3 – China’s Exports to and Imports from Iraq (value in millions of US dollars) 
 
 
Year Total Export Import 
1985 135.72 133.05 2.67 
1986 158.32 155.08 3.24 
1987 76.67 73.45 3.22 
1988 63.78 63.78 0 
1989 94.74 60.91 33.80 
1990 79.52 33.64 45.88 
1991 0.36 0.08 0.28 
1992 1.27 0.67 0.60 
1993 5.52 4.87 0.65 
1994 2.42 1.55 1.07 
1995 0.91 0.30 0.61 
1996 1.15 1.04 0.11 
1997 93.20 58.98 34.22 
1998 164.53 104.67 59.86 
1999 264.07 147.95 116.12 
2000 974.90 327.26 647.64 
2001 469.99 396.97 73.02 
2002 517.06 420.82 96.24 
2003 56.38 56.06 0.32 
2004 46.98 14.94 32.05 
2005 82.40 40.80 41.60 
 
 
Source: Steve A. Yetiv, and Chunlong Lu, "China, Global Energy, and the Middle East," Middle East Journal, 61, no. 2 (2007): 199-
218.
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